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Abstract 
This MBA Professional Report proves the feasibility of using aircraft-mounted 
RFID antennas to detect commercially available Radio Frequency Identification 
(RFID) tags affixed to small vessels.  The project was conducted because 
monitoring small vessels in US coastal and inland waters is considered a gap in 
homeland security, as well as problematic for marine resource managers tasked with 
enforcing sanctuary and fishing regulations. The premises of the project are that 1) 
RFID tags are less invasive and more cost effective than other current methods of 
proposed monitoring, 2) airborne platforms can monitor areas of interest faster and 
more efficiently than surface-based monitoring systems, and 3) small-vessel 
registration numbers can be electronically associated with the serial number of the 
affixed RFID tag.  The cost of tagging each vessel is low (around $50 per vessel), 
and the tag number of any vessel could be read remotely from 0.3 to 0.5 nautical 
miles (nm) away.  The agency reading the tag would be able to retrieve the 
associated vessel registration information from a national database through a back-
end data-link system.  This system could improve coastal and port security by 
providing remote monitoring of real-time vessel location information and could 
enable improvements in resource management methods by enabling correlation of 
location and identification data for recreational vessels engaged in natural resource 
use. 
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Executive Summary 
This project shows the feasibility of detecting commercially available Radio 
Frequency Identification (RFID) tags on small vessels with aircraft-mounted RFID 
antennas. The reason for the project is that monitoring small vessels in US coastal 
and inland waters is currently considered a gap in homeland security as well as 
problematic for marine resource managers tasked with enforcing sanctuary and 
fishing regulations.  
The main concepts of the project are that 1) RFID tags are less invasive and 
more cost effective than other methods of proposed monitoring, such as Global 
Positioning System (GPS) or Automatic Identification System (AIS) monitoring, and 
that 2) all small vessels be registered to a national database.  Their registration 
numbers would not only be printed on the vessel (as is now the case for those 
vessels that are registered separately by states or the USCG) but also would be 
associated with an RFID tag affixed to the vessel.  This concept is analogous to an 
electronic license plate on a motor vehicle. 
The cost for tagging is low (around $50 per vessel) and could be incorporated 
with the registration fee. The benefit is that the tag number of any vessel could be 
read from within 1/3 of a nautical mile (or farther as technology is refined), and the 
agency reading the tag would be able to retrieve the associated information from a 
national database through a back-end, real-time, data-link system. This back-end to 
tag number requirement preserves the boat-owner’s right to privacy.  The only 
information broadcasted by the tag is the tag number, which is useless to 
unauthorized personnel in the same way that a motor-vehicle license plate number 
is useless to other drivers on the road. 
This system would enable interested agencies, such as the Coast Guard and 
the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), to remotely identify 
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port security by providing remote detection of real-time information on vessels, and 
could enable improvements in resource management methods by enabling 
correlation of location and identification data for recreational vessels engaged in 
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I. Introduction 
This paper presents the findings of a feasibility study on the use of Radio 
Frequency Identification (RFID) technology onboard an airborne asset for the 
purpose of remotely identifying small vessels. The study was conducted in order to 
broaden the concept, as proposed by the literature so far, of how to apply RFID 
technology to the problem of monitoring small vessels for the purposes of homeland 
security and marine resource management. This research considers the strengths 
and weaknesses of an RFID system.  Additionally, this study shows RFID to be a 
cost-effective alternative to more expensive and complex technologies that perform 
similar functions.  Finally, a procurement template and an acquisition plan for 
implementing aerial RFID as a component of a multi-tiered approach to homeland 
security and resource management is included to accelerate potential program-
management efforts. 
A. Background of Coastal Monitoring Requirements 
Since terrorist activity within the continental United States began to escalate 
in the mid 1990s,1 culminating in the attacks of September 11, 2001, the United 
States National Security Strategy has identified several weaknesses in our nation’s 
capacity for insuring homeland security (DHS, 2008). Among these weaknesses are 
the gaps in port security and monitoring of coastal waterways with regard to small 
vessels (DHS, 2008).  One obvious example is that it would be possible to use a 
small boat, such as that used to successfully drive explosives into the USS Cole, to 
target sensitive, shore-side facilities such as the United Nations Building on the East 
River in Manhattan, New York. 
                                            
1 Such terrorism can be (and has been) of foreign origin and politically motivated, such as the 1993 
World Trade Center bombing conducted by Ramzi Yousef (Wright, 2006), or domestically motivated, 
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The question of how to monitor and account for the movement of small 
vessels2 (for the purpose of identifying anomalies that may pose a threat to shore-
side or floating targets of interest) has proven to be a difficult one to answer. The 
small size, ubiquity, and private nature of these vessels make it very difficult to track 
and account for them, particularly within the current small-vessel regulatory 
environment.  Anyone who has spent time in a busy inland waterway or urban 
harbor on a weekend in July knows that individual boats can become practically 
invisible in the glare, the chop, and the confusion of crowded and chaotic movement.  
Conversely, a recreational-sized boat can also become invisible on the horizon of a 
large, empty bay or coastal waterway. And for vessels that—despite these physical 
obstacles—can be identified with current visual methods as vessels potentially 
needing more attention, there is the issue of accessibility of information. At the time 
of this writing, federal (Coast Guard) registration is only required on vessels greater 
than 30 feet in length or displacing3 five gross tons. All other vessels4 need only be 
registered with the state of their home port.  The result of this separation is that 
registration data on small vessels is inconsistent and difficult to access, particularly 
since a vessel may be operated far from its home port, where local or even federal 
authorities do not have easy access to information.  These difficulties are 
compounded by the fact that the areas in which boats operate are vast, often 
adverse, and inherently difficult to patrol. 
In such an environment, there are few barriers to entry for an individual.  For 
example, a person needs a government-issued driver’s license to drive a car, and 
each car is driven within the confines of roadways.  Cars also have a visible 
registration number that is accessible nationally and is easy for law enforcement to 
                                            
2 Defined as any watercraft, regardless of the method of propulsion, that is generally less than 300 
gross tons and used for recreational or commercial purposes (DHS, 2008). 
3 Displacement refers to the amount of water displaced by the hull of a vessel. 
4 Of the approximately 21 million small vessels in US waters, approximately 8 million, or 38%, are 
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see. But anyone can operate a small boat, for which registration information is hard 
to see and confirm on water. In addition, large waterways require much more 
manpower to patrol from the surface than would be necessary on roadways.  There 
are approximately 10,758 nautical miles5 of coastline in the United States (“United 
States,” 2009).  The monitoring of waterways, therefore, requires a system that can 
be used over long ranges and is flexible enough to work in various environments 
and coastal conditions. 
Regardless of the obvious difficulties, as noted during the DHS Small Vessel 
Summit (DHS, 2008, p. 55), coverage is needed. Specifically, there is a need for a 
means to identify individual vessels remotely, with access to information about their 
ownership, their owner’s place of residence, their registration status, and their 
boating record. 
Interestingly, marine resource managers share the same problem with access 
to vessel information and location as the DHS.  As pressure on our marine natural 
resources increases—from sources such as climate change and over-fishing—
resource managers are faced with a greater need to monitor human activity around 
the protected and regulated areas of our coasts.  The areas to be monitored are 
vast6 and, as with security monitoring, the manpower for patrol is insufficient. 
The question of how to account for small vessels, whether for national 
defense or resource management, has become one of maximizing information and 
coverage per unit of monitoring effort per dollar spent. 
The concept of using RFID technology to monitor small vessels was proposed 
in 2007 by NOAA Corps Officer LCDR John Crofts while he was a student at the 
Naval Postgraduate School (Crofts, 2007).  Crofts’ proposal was to monitor vessel 
                                            
5 The coastline is defined as the land border of an area of water that stretches out 12 nm to the US 
seaward limits of the US territorial sea, and 200 nm to the limits of the US Exclusive Economic Zone. 
6 The US has approximately 1.8 million square miles of coastline and seaways, not counting the area 
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movement through bottleneck waterways around harbors and urban coastal areas 
by mounting RFID interrogators at fixed locations on shore, and aiming them at the 
appropriate angle to read data from tagged vessels passing through the monitored 
area.  This system is premised on the assumption that small-vessel registration 
become integrated nationally and that all registered vessels be required to display 
RFID tags.   
An RFID monitoring system is also premised on the concept that a negative 
response is an actionable event, meaning that the interrogators are paired with video 
or infrared (or other such sensing devices), so that the detection of a vessel 
correlated with the absence of the detection of a tag raises a red flag.  The theory is 
that an unregistered vessel, for example, passing through the spans of the Highway 
80 San Francisco-Oakland Bay Bridge, perhaps having just passed under the 
Golden Gate from an unknown origin, would sound an alarm to on-watch personnel 
as being a vessel target with no tag verification.  This would be probable cause for 
brief high-definition surveillance, which might reveal suspicious cues on the vessel—
perhaps suspicious weapon-like objects being handled, etc. If alarm and supporting 
evidence were sufficient, a patrol could be dispatched to intercept the vessel before 
it traveled the 0.5 nautical miles around the piers off 2nd Street and to within meters 
of the 30,000 baseball fans at AT&T Park. 
The fixed system proposed by Crofts has potential but is limited by the 
scarcity of areas in which commercially available RFID technology could adequately 
create such bottleneck monitoring points. 
The premise of this paper is the addition of a roving airborne RFID 
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into a multi-tiered surveillance system that serves multiple end-users by selective 
provision of need-to-know information.7 
The authors envision a system in which RFID tags are the equivalent of 
electronic license plates, and are readable from not only fixed bottleneck locations 
but also from resource-management and DHS aircraft. Tag numbers would be 
matched against a national database via secure networks, and the information about 
the tag-holder that would be available to a unit making an inquiry in the database 
would be limited to the information only that unit is authorized to access.  For 
example, if a National Marine Sanctuaries enforcement officer flew over a sanctuary 
closed to fishing, saw boats fishing there, and picked up their tag numbers via the 
aircraft’s RFID reader, the information she could access through the database would 
be limited to name, address and fishing license-type data.  However, an FBI agent 
following a lead on a potential terrorist attack in a harbor may have additional access 
to the vessel-owner’s criminal record, citizenship information, and his/her terrorist 
watch-list/no-fly status. 
Until the research summarized in this paper was conducted, the concept of 
incorporating RFID tags on surface vessels and interrogating them from aircraft had 
not been attempted or documented.  Additionally, some doubted whether it was 
even feasible to read a commercially available tag from the distances and angles 
necessary for airborne interrogation. 
B. Strengths and Weaknesses of RFID Monitoring 
There are distinct limitations to using RFID for monitoring purposes.  
However, the primary weakness with RFID can also be considered one of its major 
strengths, depending on the perspective of the small-vessel issue being considered.  
                                            
7 The concept of fixed RFID monitoring stations was shown to be extremely low cost. While adding an 
aerial component may add to the cost of an RFID system, the benefits of the system and the 
monetary costs associated with them, as outlined in this paper, suggest that the resultant capability of 
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From a purely technical and functional point of view, RFID is extremely limited by a 
short, line-of-sight range of effectiveness and by the nature of the information gained 
from RFID activity.  More specifically, the only information resource-management or 
DHS personnel will receive via the RFID tag/reader interface is the identification 
number of a vessel’s tag and that will only be received from a tag that is within 
approximately 0.75 nautical miles of the reader.  The implications of these limitations 
are that a vessel must be intentionally “looked at” in order to receive a tag number 
and that the information corresponding to the tag number received is limited to the 
access level of the interrogating agency.  
Compared to current suggestions to require all vessels to carry an Automatic 
Information System (AIS) or even a GPS-linked monitoring device, we consider the 
limitations of RFID to be an advantage. This is especially true when one considers 
the constitutional right to privacy of US boat owners, the primary stakeholder in the 
issue of vessel monitoring.  The RFID system proposed by this paper is in the 
category of “passive” observation, which distinguishes it from systems such as AIS 
that actively and continually broadcast personally identifiable information (PII) and 
location data about a vessel and its owner. 
Although AIS and GPS are effective monitoring tools and have their place in 
helping resource and security managers monitor commercial vessels, they are costly 
to implement and maintain, likely to be considered invasive by the public, and 
overwhelmingly cumbersome to use on small vessels, given the current state of 
technology.  For example, AIS is currently required of many commercial vessels, 
with the result that large ships and boats working in and around vessel traffic 
schemes show up on all compatible RADAR and electronic navigation displays as 
special icons with directional vectors and data summaries.  AIS broadcasters alone 
can cost hundreds to thousands of dollars, but beyond that, they require integration 
with professional-grade bridge equipment that adds thousands more to the cost per 
boat.  How can one realistically expect the taxpayer, let alone a citizen who owns a 
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systems?  This is a case in which the law of diminishing returns may apply.  Added 
to the financial limitations of AIS is the fact that even now, with only commercial 
vessels carrying AIS, professional mariners operating in the vicinity of a busy port 
with many other commercial vessels will see an overwhelming amount of AIS 
information on their navigation systems, making it difficult to distinguish between 
significant and insignificant information on the displays.  If small vessels were 
broadcasting AIS as well, the amount of traffic around commercial ports like Long 
Beach, Galveston, Boston, Baltimore, Philadelphia, New York, and many others 
would likely create AIS information overload for all users. 
RFID is a much more manageable, affordable, and palatable means of 
identification because it is a focused and short-range monitoring tool used at 
purposeful locations, and RFID tags carry only an RFID number that is meaningless 
until correlated via a secure network with a national database of information. Thus, 
RFID would be a more appropriate way of addressing whether further investigation 
is necessary.  In the event that further investigation is deemed necessary in any 
individual case, the DHS has much more powerful surveillance tools than AIS and 
GPS for surveillance.   
This paper not only supports the feasibility of using RFID technology from 
aircraft but also presents a sample acquisition strategy (in Appendix A) for procuring 
an aerial, RFID small-vessel monitoring system, which supports the claim that RFID 
is potentially an extremely cost-effective component of coastal homeland security 
and resource-management strategies. 
C. Overview of RFID Technology 
Radio Frequency Identification refers to the use of small transponders (called 
tags) to broadcast coded identification data (such as data normally found on product 
barcodes) as radio waves to remote receivers.  The tags are actually small computer 
chips custom fitted with an antenna to enable them to transmit data.  There have 
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string of characters. Gen 2 chips separate the tag data into three parts: the tag’s 
purpose (i.e., travel document), the type of tag (i.e., the issuer, such as Wal-Mart), 
and the unique code assigned to the tag that is matched to information (Manaher, 
2008).  Tags can be read-only, meaning their code can only be read, or they can be 
read/write, allowing a program-capable receiver to alter their code. 
The receivers typically interrogate the tags by sending a radio signal that 
initiates an automatic radio transmission of the tag’s data.  Once received, the 
interrogators translate the coded data into useable information. 
The modern RFID label typically refers to a three-part system, consisting of 
the tags, the interrogators, and a “back end system” (Manaher, 2008), or mechanism 
for converting the translated tag data received by the interrogator into actionable 
information. This method, the third part of an RFID system, is usually a computer 
system that matches the tag ID to its corresponding information in a database.  For 
example, RFID systems used to prevent loss or theft of pets8 consist of a small chip,9 
the size of a grain of rice, encased in bio-safe material and encoded with a number 
that identifies the chip.  The Gen 2 chip identification code includes digits that 
identify which pet-monitoring company owns the chip.  This chip is injected under the 
pet’s skin on the back of its neck.  
When a stray animal is brought to a veterinarian or SPCA10 shelter, the 
veterinarian or shelter personnel scans the animal with a hand-held interrogator that 
broadcasts a radio signal.  If present, a coiled antenna in the tag will be activated by 
this signal and reflect its ID back to the interrogator. 
Once received, the ID is translated by the interrogator and then transmitted to 
a computer, either by data cable or wirelessly. The computer then accesses the 
                                            
8 Pet tags are commonly referred to as “microchips.” 
9 The term “chip” is used interchangeably with “tag,” as an RFID tag is a modified computer nanochip. 





do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 9 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
database of the appropriate monitoring company via a “middleware” (Rieback, 
Crispo & Tanenbaum, 2006) program using a secure website, in which the tag ID is 
matched to archived information about the animal—specifically the name, address 
and contact information of the animal’s owner.  Using this analogy, our concept is, 
essentially, to “chip” small vessels with systems powerful enough to be read from a 
plane. 
1. History of RFID 
The roots of RFID can be traced back to World War II and the advent of radio 
detection and ranging (RADAR) (Crofts, 2007).  It was soon discovered that if 
German planes could roll their aircraft while approaching their base, then it would 
change the radio signal reflected back.  This would allow German RADAR operators 
the ability to distinguish between “friend” and “foe” (Jones & Chung, 2008).  Later in 
the war, the British were able to construct the first passive RFID system by affixing a 
transponder on their planes that would emit a signal when interrogated by Allied 
RADAR.  It was not until the 1970s, however, when the RFID chip as we know it was 
developed that could contain fixed information in a “programmable-read-only-
memory” (PROM) (Ranky, 2006; Technovelgy, 2006). 
2. Passive RFID  
The basis of this style of tag, as the name suggests, is to remain inactive until 
activated by a reader (Savi Technologies, 2007).  The tag itself is not powered 
through an auxiliary power source, e.g., a battery (Savi Technoligies, 2007; 
Technovelgy, 2006). Instead, this style of tag is powered through a coiled antenna 
that creates a magnetic field when interrogated by a reader, thereby drawing power 
from the reader (Technovelgy, 2006).  This method of powering the chip has several 
advantages and disadvantages. 
Fundamental disadvantages for passive RFID tags come in the form of 
power, lifecycle, read-rates and read-rate distances (Li, Visich, Khumawala & Zhang, 
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outside source via radio frequency from the reader, the tags do not function without 
the outside power source (Jones & Chung, 2008). It is difficult, if not impossible, to 
integrate the tag into a standalone sensor package; such a change would require a 
second interface to tie them together (Savi Technologies, 2007; Technovelgy, 2006).  
By not having their own power source, passive RFID tags can have an extended 
lifecycle that can be unnecessary when the item no longer needs to be tracked, such 
as when it is purchased, removed from service or destroyed (Technovelgy, 2006).  
Lastly, the passive RFID tag has much lower read-rate distance ability because it 
lacks a stand-alone power source (Savi Technologies, 2007).  The RFID tag must be 
within close proximity to the reader in order to have an appropriate signal strength to 
be read (Technovelgy, 2006; Lee & Kim, 2006).  This can lead to the inability to read 
tags sufficiently in a hurried environment.  
There are, however, several key advantages to this type of tag.  Since the 
tags do not require an auxiliary power source, the lifespan of the tags can reach up 
to 20 years (Jones & Chung, 2008).  They are considerably less expensive to 
construct11 (Technovelgy, 2006), and because of their independence from a power 
source, their size is also considerably smaller,12 allowing them to be used in a wide 
variety of applications (2006). 
3. Active RFID 
Active RFID tags have a power source, providing them the capability to 
constantly transmit information (Savi Technologies, 2007; Lin, 2008).  The power 
source may be an internal battery that may or may not be serviceable by the end-
user, or it maybe an external battery that is powering other sensors as well (Savi 
Technologies, 2007; Jones & Chung, 2008).  As with passive tags, active RFID tags 
have both distinct advantages and disadvantages. 
                                            
11 The cost of a passive tag can be reduced to 40 cents.  
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Some of the distinct disadvantages associated with active RFID tags are size, 
power consumption, cost, and maintainability (Savi Technologies, 2007; 
Technovelgy, 2006).  Because the active tag requires an energy source, the tag is 
usually much larger in size.  This may limit the tag’s potential uses in some 
applications  (Savi Technologies, 2007). In an environment in which space can be at 
a premium, this attribute can have serious shortcomings13 (Technovelgy, 2006).  If 
size is sacrificed for battery performance, there is a high risk that the power source 
will fail, which can lead to expensive errors in tracking14 (Savi Technologies, 2007; Li 
et al., 2006).  Service-life cost can be a drawback if the tags are to be used over a 
period of time that would require the necessity of trained personnel to perform 
periodic maintenance of the unit and its power source (Jones & Chung, 2008; 
Borthick, Bowen & Gerard, 2008).  Lastly, the cost of purchasing an active tag can 
be fifty times larger than a passive tag (Technovelgy, 2006). 
Conversely, there are many distinct advantages of having an active RFID tag. 
Because the tag has its own power source, the tag can have considerable signal 
strength, enabling transmissions up to hundreds of meters (Crofts, 2007; Savi 
Technologies, 2007; Technovelgy, 2006).  The read-rate capability is not limited to 
the tag;15 rather, it is limited to the reader and how fast it can capture the tag data 
(Savi Technologies, 2007).  That data can contain diagnostic information, can allow 
the tag to be integrated into a sensor array that can be networked to allow for real-
time tracking, and can be used as a continuously monitoring security system 
(Technovelgy, 2006). 
                                            
13 Imagine a palette full of products that need to be tracked individually. Adding an RFID tracker the 
size of a pack of gum can limit the space to place product considerably.  
14 Imagine if that same palette mentioned above had 1/3 of its tags disabled due to dead batteries.  
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4. Privacy Issues with RFID 
As with other recent advances in information technology—such as the 
growing ubiquity of internet use for everything from academic research to buying 
shoes—the rapid development and implementation of RFID technology has created 
a unique set of issues with regard to privacy. 
The right to privacy encompasses a wide variety of concepts. Perhaps the 
most famous definition of privacy was […] the “right to be left alone,” by 
Justice Louis D. Brandeis in Olmstead v. United States, 277 US 438[1].  In 
the digital era, informational privacy is a focus of increasing public concern. 
Informational privacy refers to the right of an individual to retain control over 
the collection and use of personally identifiable facts and information about 
their daily lives. (Kelly & Erikson, 2005) 
Before the use of a computer to manage information, it was much easier to 
control the collection and use of PII.  There was more of a physical barrier to cross 
since information could only be collected in person and could only be stored on 
printed media that was kept in restricted locations (Kelly & Erikson, 2005). 
Even public information, such as property title information, was difficult to 
access. But today, with the majority of public and private information being handled 
by databases accessible through the internet (Brown & Kros, 2003), PII is more 
accessible than ever. 
This problem will exist with or without RFID technology, but RFID does 
increase the ease of access to PII by making information that was previously 
available only through some form of direct contact now available by remote sensing. 
It is important to note, however, that within the typical RFID system, the 
critical information—for example, residential or financial information, technical 
information, etc.—is not stored on the tag itself and, therefore, is impossible to be 
transmitted by the tag.  The only thing stored and transmitted by the tag is the ID 
number of the tag. This number must be matched to the desired information by the 
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database, not the RFID tag, just as the security of a car owner’s PII is dependent on 
how well the database is secured at the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV), not 
whether people can see the license plate number. 
This need for association, although reassuring in the respect that PII cannot 
be retrieved from a tag without access to its corresponding database, does not 
eliminate privacy concerns.  In fact, not only does RFID still have the potential to 
compromise static PII (see Chapter I.C.5 titled RFID Susceptibility to Hacking) but 
also it introduces new concerns unique to RFID (Kelly & Erikson, 2005). For 
example, Lee and Kim (2006) summarized RFID privacy threats as falling into four 
major categories: location, constellation, preference, and transaction threats.  
Location Threat: Regardless of whether the information associated with a 
card is accessible, tag readers are inconspicuous and can be placed or used by 
unauthorized entities without the owner’s knowledge or consent.  This reveals at 
least the location of a tag and makes that location subject to unauthorized 
disclosure. 
What if a still-enabled chip was the basis for a burglary? Tech Savvy burglars 
could purchase readers and drive through neighborhoods on the days that 
trash or recyclables are collected looking for discarded packaging with 
embedded tags that indicate expensive computers, electronics, cameras, etc., 
were purchased. If the RFID tag is embedded into the product itself, a thief 
could simply walk or drive by a house and note the Sony plasma television, 
Dell computer or other expensive equipment that resided inside. (Kelly & 
Erikson, 2005) 
Constellation Threat: Location threats are more of a problem when 
considered in light of the fact that particular tag IDs, though not conveying PII, can 
be learned to be associated with a particular person, forming what is called a 
“constellation” of tags that are known to be owned by the person.16  Once a 
                                            
16 The concept of constellations are analogous to the aggregation of various unclassified pieces of 
information, which when combined create a potentially classified composite picture and an 
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constellation is established—for example, if someone were being followed and the 
follower learned the ID of merchandise tags active in the person’s coat, hat, mobile 
phone, and wallet—various readers could be used to reveal the location of that 
person’s objects. 
This is a significant problem when considered in light of future technological 
advancements to place RFID reading capabilities on mobile phones, which will be 
widely available to the public (Lee & Kim, 2006). It is not difficult to imagine good 
hackers modifying RFID-enabled phones, giving them the capability to track 
constellations. 
Transaction Threat: The ability to infer transactions between people when 
tags move from one constellation to another. 
Preference Threat: The notion that some seemingly innocuous information, 
such as manufacturer and product type, may be part of a tag ID and can reveal 
information about a person’s preferences. 
5. RFID Susceptibility to Hacking 
As shown by Rieback, Crispo, and Tanenbaum (2006), because of the RFID 
tag’s simplicity and the general lack of attention paid to securing the interface 
between RFID tags and their middleware, the tags themselves can be re-
programmed by Radio Frequency (RF) to insert malware into back end-system 
programs when scanned.  This malware could be used to initiate malicious virus or 
worm activities such as Denial of Service (DoS) attacks (in which system function is 
inhibited) or could even compromise the security of a back-end database, making it 
possible for hackers to access information via openings created by code inserted 
with RFID data. 
Safeguards against these types of attack would be fairly simple to incorporate 
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D. Potential for RFID Monitoring of Small Vessels 
As outlined in this paper, there is a need to monitor small vessels for the 
purposes of port security, law enforcement, and marine resource management. 
Indeed, Crofts (2007) also noted a need to improve search and rescue (SAR) 
capacity in the marine environment via RFID capabilities.  
It is well known that more advanced systems of vessel monitoring exist and 
are in place for large vessels.17 The International Maritime Organization’s (IMO) 
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) requires:  
Automatic Identification Systems (AIS), capable of providing information 
about the ship to other ships and to coastal authorities automatically, to be 
fitted aboard all ships of 300 gross tonnage and upwards engaged on 
international voyages, cargo ships of 500 gross tonnage and upwards not 
engaged on international voyages and passenger ships irrespective of size. 
(IMO, 2007) 
AIS is a system that integrates location, speed, course, and qualitative 
information from an array of electronic sources on the ship—including the navigation 
software and the ship’s computerized RADAR system—then broadcasts the 
information by VHF radio to all other ships and land stations equipped with receivers 
(USCG, 2009).  As mentioned above, AIS equipment is extremely expensive to 
purchase and maintain, relies on technology that is not available on the average 
small vessel, and is considerably more invasive of the boater’s privacy than RFID.  It 
is, therefore, not a practical solution to the problem of small-vessel monitoring. 
Crofts (2007) points out that although AIS is not required of small vessels, 
there are other identification requirements they must comply with.  As previously 
mentioned, all vessels over 30 feet in length or over five gross tons in displacement 
must be documented with the US Coast Guard and are then referred to as 
documented vessels.  All undocumented vessels with propulsion machinery must be 
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registered by name of vessel and hailing port18 with the state in which the hailing port 
is located (USC, 2007). 
Currently, the only way to identify the 13.2 million small vessels in the United 
States (DHS, 2008) is to get close enough to physically see the registration number 
or name and port of the vessel (Crofts, 2007).  An RFID system could be used to 
make this information available by remote sensing, enabling management agencies 
to identify and monitor movement of a large numbers of vessels from a great 
distance at a relatively low cost. 
Crofts’ (2007) proposed and field-tested RFID experiment consisted of a 
customized RFID system using active RFID tags encoded with unique identifiers that 
would correspond to vessel and owner information stored on secure back-end 
servers.  As mentioned earlier, it would not be possible to cover all of the potential 
roaming area of small vessels. Thus,  
Receivers to interrogate these tags would likely be placed in narrow 
waterways that act as chokepoints (or bottlenecks), such as passes, inlets, 
bridge spans, and harbor entrances.  As boats came into contact with a 
receiver’s read field, their tags would be interrogated by an electromagnetic 
wave. (Crofts, 2007, p. 7) 
Active tags were chosen because of the increased distance from which an 
active tag can be read,19 allowing for the potential to approach a 100% read-rate. 
Using a receiver on each side of a “bottleneck” waterway, the system would be 
capable of monitoring a waterway as wide as 400 meters (2007). 
E. Issues That Necessitate Small-Vessel Monitoring 
1. Homeland Security, Safety, and Enforcement Issues
                                            
18 “Hailing port” refers to the homeport of the vessel. 
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a. Port Security 
Prior to the plane-based terrorist attacks made against the United States on 
September 11, 2001, port security was mainly focused on large ships.  Since 9/11, 
the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which draws its authority from the 
Homeland Security Act of 2002, has identified small vessels as having considerable 
potential for use by terrorists acting against the United States.  Small vessels are a 
relatively easy means by which terrorists can deliver weapons of mass destruction 
(WMDs) and have already been used overseas to deliver Waterborne Improvised 
Explosive Devices (WBIEDs) (DHS, 2008). At the National Small Vessel Security 
Summit on June 19, 2007, DHS Secretary Michael Chertoff said,  
I will guarantee you one thing—the enemy is not wasting time. […] Remind 
yourself about The Sullivans. Remind yourself about the Cole. Remind 
yourself about that French tanker, the Limburg. This attack technique […] is 
one they have used before. It is one that they will likely use again. Let us work 
together to make our protections against this as robust as they can be in a 
way that preserves the traditional freedom of the seas, our economic mobility 
and our continued pleasure and boating on our oceans and in our waterways. 
(DHS, 2008, p. 31) 
According to the recently released 2008 DHS Small Vessel Security Strategy, 
there is a need to “enhance maritime security and safety,” incorporate the small 
vessel community as a partner, work to “enhance maritime domain awareness,” and 
“leverage technology to enhance the ability to detect, infer intent, and when 
necessary, interdict small vessels that pose a threat” (2008, p. iv).  The strategy 
makes an impressive case for the need to consider small vessels and outlines an 
exhaustive list of regulatory documents that must be considered in the strategy.20 
                                            
20 Regulatory documents include, but are not limited to, National Strategy for Homeland Security and 
the DHS Strategic plan, National Security Presidential Directive-41/Homeland Security Presidential 
directive-13 (NSPD-41/HSPD-13), National Plan to Achieve Maritime Domain Awareness, Global 
Maritime Intelligence Integration Plan, Maritime Operational Threat Response Plan, International 
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It is interesting to note that in the development of all of these strategies and 
regulations, the DHS has seemingly remained conscientious of the need to preserve 
the privacy and rights of small-vessel operators.  This is partly due to the 
constitutional responsibility the Federal Government has to its citizens, but it is also 
due in part to a component of ingratiation since the plan recognizes the need for 
cooperation from small-vessel operators as “eyes on the water” watchdogs.  
Particularly with regard to the use of technology to address small-vessel 
management, the 2008 DHS report states, “Technology will serve as an important, 
complementary component to enhance subsequent plans, initiatives, and actions 
[…] but it is not the sole answer to ensure small vessel security. Additionally, 
leveraging technology will mitigate risks but should also minimize impacts to small 
vessel operators” (2008, p. 15).  It is precisely this need to balance a requirement for 
maximum information with a necessity for minimum impact on small-vessel 
operators that may prove RFID—with its low cost, low maintenance, and limited 
tracking ability—to be an ideal technological application for the purpose of 
monitoring small vessels.  
In June of 2008, the DHS convened a summit with representatives from 
various government agencies and private and commercial boating communities to 
develop recommendations for recreational boat security. RFID was suggested at this 
summit as a means for monitoring small vessels (Brownstein, 2008; Lipowicz, 2008).  
b. Safety and Enforcement 
As noted by Crofts (2007), one of the primary challenges of maritime search-
and-rescue organizations, such as the United States Coast Guard (USCG), is 
discerning between real and false alarms.  A search-and-rescue effort at sea 
requires an immense amount of resources.  Crofts estimated the cost of a rescue 
effort at a minimum of $3,700 per hour.21  At this rate, false alarms are an enormous 
                                            
21 $3,700 an hour for each aircraft, $1,550 an hour for each cutter, and $300–400 an hour for small 
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cost to the taxpayer, estimated to be approximately $74 million annually 
nationwide.22  A significant percentage of these false alarms are due to calls from 
concerned family members or inaccurate overdue reports.  An RFID system could 
easily be used to verify the location or return of vessels suspected of being missing.  
In the event that a vessel were truly missing, RFID monitoring could provide 
information that would help the USCG more accurately pinpoint where the vessel 
might be found. 
In addition to search and rescue, the USCG, the National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), and various state and local agencies are 
concerned with illegal boating activities, such as smuggling of drugs or illegal 
immigration and illegal fishing.  RFID could be useful to these agencies by enabling 
them to monitor vessels passing through bottleneck surveillance areas and/or by 
detecting them during active search missions. 
F. Marine Ecosystem Management Issues  
Of the issues that necessitate small-vessel monitoring, resource management 
is perhaps the most complicated to communicate. Over the next several sections, 
we will attempt to outline the major components of US marine resource 
management.  The goal is to familiarize the reader with the complexity of the 
resource-management environment and accentuate how convoluted the 
management framework has become. The relevance of this discussion to RFID is 
that we believe RFID tagging and universal registration of vessels would offer 
resource managers a way of improving the information available for resource 
decision-makers. 
Within the United States, there are currently only two federal agencies that 
are tasked with managing the marine ecosystem: the National Oceanic and 
                                            
22 This estimate was derived by extrapolation of data from the state of Washington, which was the 
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Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and the United States Fish and Wildlife Service 
(USFWS).23 Both of these agencies have multiple offices and laboratories throughout 
the country that allow them to operate in all of the coastal states.  There are two 
important pieces of legislation that mandate NOAA and USFWS to conduct marine 
resource management: the 1976 Magnuson-Stevens24 Fishery Conservation and 
Management Act25 (FCMA or Magnuson-Stevens Act) (US DoC–NOAA, 2007b; Hsu 
& Wilen, 1997; NRC, 2006), and the 1996 Sustainable Fisheries Act (SFA)26 (US 
DoC–NOAA, 2007b; Hsu & Wilen, 1997; NRC, 2006). 
1. Background of Marine Ecosystem Management Legislation 
The FCMA was the original piece of legislation that created the architecture 
for the current policies in the execution of marine ecosystem management (US 
DoC–NOAA, 2007a). The management was required because policy-makers noted 
that most of the world’s important and valuable fisheries lay in close proximity to the 
continental shelf27 (USCG, 2008b), and steps were needed to secure the economic 
prosperity of the marine fishery in the United States. It should be noted, however, 
that because of the highly migratory nature of many of the ocean’s species, this 
policy did very little to secure the United States’ fisheries (Hsu & Wilen, 1997).  It 
was not until the 1982 United Nations Law of the Sea Convention,28—in which the 
boundary known as the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) was extended out to 200 
                                            
23 NOAA, a bureau within the Department of Commerce, will routinely create marine ecosystem 
policy, and USFWS, a bureau within the Department of the Interior, will enforce those policies, while 
both agencies coordinate with research and law enforcement.  
24 The FMCA was created by Senators Warren G. Magnuson from Washington state and Ted 
Stevens from Alaska. 
25 The Magnuson-Stevens Act was reauthorized by President George W. Bush. This allowed for 
several amendments to be created to increase rigorous enforcement of the act.  
26 The SFA is considered a supplement to the FCMA by removing some ambiguity in definitions, 
setting new standards for by-catch and stiffer consequences for derelict fishing gear.  
27 The continental shelf can extend only a few miles on the Pacific Coast but may extend for many 
miles on the Atlantic Coast. Therefore, a “line” was drawn on charts to sector off a 12-mile radius from 
the US Coast as sovereign US territory.  
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nautical miles—that the United States (and other nations in their respective 
territories) were able to legally exclude foreign fishing-vessel fleets from territorial 
waters as well as curtail domestic fishing fleets (UN, 1982). 
In 1996, an amendment was passed, the Sustainable Fisheries Act (SFA), 
that helped close several loop holes in the original legislation (Hsu & Wilen, 1997; 
US DoC–NOAA, 2007a). The following is an example of some of the potentially 
vague language contained in the original bill: “to provide for the preparation and 
implementation, in accordance with the national standards, of fishery management 
plans which will achieve and maintain, on a continuing basis, the optimum yield from 
each fishery by the United States fishing industry” (US DoC, 2007b, p. 3). 
While on the surface this language seems to put forth a clear set of directives, 
the term “optimal yield” (US DoC–NOAA, 2007a) was only given a definition as “the 
amount of fish which will provide the greatest overall benefit to the Nation” (Hsu & 
Wilen, 1997, p. 802).  Once the SFA was passed, the vague term of “optimal yield” 
was replaced with “maximum sustainable yield as modified by any relevant 
economic, social, or ecological factor” (US DoC–NOAA, 2007b).  Changing the term 
in this way enabled clarification of which species could be harvested and in what 
amounts.  This action also helped to reduce the amount of by-catch29 affecting other 
fisheries that was happening as result of shortened seasons30 (Hanna, 1998). 
                                            
29 By-catch can be defined as the process of catching unintended species while engaged in 
consumptive fishing. The net result once the unintended species has been procured is that it will die 
or be killed and discarded. For instance, when fishing for tuna on a large scale, commercial fishermen 
sometimes catch dolphins in the nets.  
30 Fishery councils have the ability to open and close fishing seasons and to determine the length of 
the season. Some fishing seasons may last several weeks while others last only mere hours. 
Because some seasons may be so short, there is a rush to the fishing grounds that creates undesired 
consequences (e.g., since the season is so short, commercial fishers invest in equipment that will 
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2. Marine Ecosystem Use 
There are two factions within the marine ecosystem framework that are of 
concern to those who are tasked with resource management: consumptive and non-
consumptive actions (Fall et al., 2001). The former can be further defined as an 
individual or entities engaged in the complete or partial removal of living species 
from the benthic31 or pelagic32 (marine) domain, e.g., commercial fishermen (Mullon, 
Freon, & Curry, 2005; USCG, 2008b).  Non-consumptive marine use can be further 
segmented into two major categories: recreational and commercial (Vaccaro & 
Sepez, 2003).  Recreational can also be defined as an individual or entity who does 
not actively remove anything from the marine domain, e.g., whale watching (Beeh, 
1999).  
a. Consumptive Recreational Use 
It was often thought that recreational fishermen had a marginal impact on fish 
stocks when compared to the large fishing fleets that dotted the US coastlines (NRC, 
2006; King, 1995).  However, this mindset is proving to be incorrect.  According to a 
2006 report to Congress by the National Research Council (NRC),33 there are 14 
million recreational fishermen in the US that made almost 82 million fishing trips in 
the calendar year 2004 (NRC, 2006).  According to the NRC, while the impact of 
each individual fisherman is only a small number of landings, the summation of 
these landings throughout the country can be quite large.  So large, in fact, that 
some estimates place the landings in excess of what the large commercial fishing 
fleets can land (NMFS–FSD, 2004).  For instance, a study prepared by the National 
Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) estimates that in 2005, 11,900 metric tons of the 
Atlantic Striped Bass were landed by recreational fishermen—as opposed to 3,000 
                                            
31 Benthic means having to do with the ocean floor. 
32 Pelagic means having to do with the open ocean, i.e., the water column. 
33 The NRC is a non-profit institution that has been given a presidential charter to give independent 
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metric tons landed by the commercial industry (Shepherd, 2006).  That translates to 
almost 80% of the catch being made by a segment of the consumptive-use 
population that was thought to be marginal (Shepherd, 2006; NRC, 2006). 
The impact made by recreational fishermen is clearly not trivial. The NMFS 
has also stated that saltwater fishing is a tremendous cost driver within the US 
economy that generates roughly $82.3 billion annually and supports over 534,000 
jobs throughout the country (US DoC–NOAA-Fisheries, 2008, p. 21). With all that 
recreational fishermen provide to the economy, it would not be that difficult to 
understand why these stakeholders would have such reservations about any type of 
fishery resource management that would have a negative impact on them. 
b. Recreational Fisherman Rebuttal 
Recreational fishermen believe that any type of interference can be construed 
as unconstitutional, a risk to tourism dollars, an injustice to those who solely rely on 
subsistence fishing, or just mismanagement of marine resources (Bailey, 2006; 
Vaccaro & Sepez, 2003).  In many state constitutions, it is deemed a right to be able 
to fish.  For instance, Article I, section 17 of the Rhode Island Constitution states, 
“The people shall continue to enjoy and freely exercise all the rights of the fishery 
and the privileges of the shore” (Conley & Flanders, 2007, p. 93). The Minnesota 
State Constitution states, “Hunting and fishing and the taking of game and fish are a 
valued part of our heritage that shall be forever preserved for the people” (Morrison, 
2002, p. 299). Therefore, many recreational fishermen view this as a right that has 
been bestowed upon them to give them free and open access to fishing grounds; 
thus, no regulatory body should stop them.  
Some recreational fishermen are concerned that heavily regulating 
recreational fishing will adversely affect tourism. While there have not been any 
direct studies to bolster such a claim, there are clear examples of what recreational 
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receives almost “two billion dollars annually from recreational fishing activities” 
(William, 2008, p. 1), and significant portions of those fishermen are tourists34 (2008, 
p. 1). 
The impact may not only be felt in terms of dollars; rather, the effect may be 
felt in terms of survival, i.e., subsistence fishermen (Fall et al., 2001).  There are 
several locations throughout this country in which local inhabitants who abide by 
customs and traditions (Native American tribes) routinely rely on subsistence 
practices as a primary means of feeding their family (Fall et al., 2001; Vaccaro & 
Sepez, 2003).  According to a report by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA),35 in 198036 in the state of Alaska, which had a population 
level of 640,000 residents, 17.2% of the population directly participated in 
subsistence activities37 (Fall et al., 2001).  In 2001, of those that participated in 
subsistence activities in Alaska, 60% of what they harvested was fish (Fall et al., 
2001).  Thus, it is clear that even a small impact on fishing regulations could have a 
large impact on subsistence fishermen who rely on this activity as a primary means 
of survival.  It has been purported that a potential reason for fishery stocks declining 
in the US is not from the amount of fish being harvested from the ocean.  Rather, the 
decline is from poor or faulty management by regulatory officials that may or may not 
be influenced by inaccurate data (Fish Net USA, 2006; Bailey, 2006).  The standard 
set of data that is routinely scrutinized by individuals at all levels is the Marine 
                                            
34 The term tourist is used to signify someone from outside the local area and need not refer to 
someone from outside the state. California natives are considered tourists if they travel from areas 
that are inland in the state to coastal areas to fish. 
35 The NOAA is an agency within the Department of Commerce. 
36 1980 was a baseline year for subsistence surveys in Alaska, and subsequent surveys focus more 
on regionality and specific species.  
37The same report also estimates that the effects of the subsistence activities extend beyond the 
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Recreational Fisheries Statistical Survey (MRFSS)38 and its subsequent inputs, e.g., 
aggregate catch per unit effort (CPUE) (NRC, 2006; Pierce & Hughes, 1979).  
 (1) MRFSS. The MRFSS is the framework that marine ecosystem 
resource managers utilize when setting catch quotas and determining 
fishery season lengths.  Its potential inaccuracy is the crux for 
arguments that are made to denigrate its ability39 (NRC, 2006; Pierce 
& Hughes, 1979). In 2006, the NOAA asked the National Research 
Council (NRC) to evaluate the MRFSS and its effectiveness and make 
potential recommendations of its usefulness and timeliness.40  
Subsequently, the NRC submitted their report to the NOAA and 
Congress outlining the survey’s deficiencies.41  
 (2) The MRFSS Survey.  As mentioned at the beginning of the 
Marine Ecosystem Management section, of the issues that necessitate 
small-vessel monitoring, resource management is perhaps the most 
complex, and the relevance to RFID is that we believe RFID tagging 
and universal registration of vessels would offer resource managers a 
way of improving the information available for resource decision-
makers. This section on the MRFSS survey accentuates the need for 
improvement in data-gathering methods for recreational catch. 
 The survey is conducted in two ways: point-access or telephone-
access (NRC, 2006).  For point-access surveys, a surveyor will 
physically meet vessels or people and ask them questions about their 
recent fishing experience (NRC, 2006; Kleiber & Maunder, 2008; 
Committee on Fish Stock Assessment Methods et al., 1998).  A major 
problem with this type of interrogation is that not all areas of interest 
are accessible, such as a private dock that is not open to the public 
(Committee on Fish Stock Assessment Methods et al., 1998). 
Interviewers may not be trained well enough to correctly identify a 
species.  The spatial scale is so large that trying to accomplish this 
type of survey is fiscally impracticable.  In order to mitigate the 
                                            
38 The NOAA initiated the MRFSS in 1979 in hopes of capturing statistical data about recreational 
fishermen.  
39 The MRFSS is not used in all states. Some states don’t participate in the survey at all.  
40 One key argument that is made is that the MRFSS has been unable to keep up with the ever-
growing demand on fishery stocks, and it has not been able to take full advantage of recent 
advancements in mathematics, i.e., the survey is outdated, and current decisions are made on a set 
of data that has outlived its usefulness.  
41 There were so many deficiencies and recommendations that the NRC actually published a book 
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overwhelming cost in terms of both dollars and time that would be 
associated with point-access interviews, the telephone-access survey 
is used.  
 The 2006 report also noted that the telephone-access survey is not 
without its faults.  The intent of the survey was to detect and report on 
potential trends within fishery populations (McMurray, 2006). In order 
to maintain scientific credibility, the NOAA conducts a “random digit 
dialing” scheme along coastal communities (NRC, 2006). When the 
survey is conducted on the phone and a potential respondent is 
identified, the results may be invalidated because of the various 
exemptions—such as age or type of fishing—and a portion of the 
sampling population can be left out of the survey (NRC, 2006).  This 
induces a bias if fishermen who don’t want to share their results try to 
hide or falsify their information when contacted.  Also, the phone-
access surveys are restricted to coastal communities only; thus, they 
do not capture anglers that reside within the interior of the US (NRC, 
2006). 
 The survey does not account for fish mortality in the practice of “catch-
and-release” fishing, meaning that some recreational fishermen who 
do not desire to remove any, some, or all of the fish caught during an 
excursion may exercise an option of releasing the fish after it has been 
caught (NRC, 2006). While this practice sounds like an effective 
employment method of non-consumptive practices, it almost certainly 
skews the total removal estimates (NRC, 2006).  The catch-and-
release method often injures, stresses, or kills the fish when it is 
caught (Hanna, 1998; Kleiber & Maunder, 2008; NRC, 2006).  It has 
been estimated that 50% of the fish caught using this method will not 
survive (Kleiber & Maunder, 2008). 
 Survey results may be inaccurate because species identification can 
be difficult for fishermen (Kleiber & Maunder, 2008). In other words, 
problems can arise when recreational fishermen who have little to no 
training in identifying fish species land their catch and have no idea 
what they have caught (NRC, 2006).  The fishermen may inadvertently 
catch a species that is not to be caught (2006).  Or, the fishermen may 
think they caught one species but, instead, have something completely 
different, and if surveyed, they may give an incorrect response as to 
what species that they have (2006). 
 There is a potential for errors with the administration and analysis of 
the survey itself. In a study by Lee, Hu, and Toh (2000), they found 
that the length of a phone call can have an effect on how the 
information was reported to the surveyor. They discovered that if the 
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overestimate the information given (2000). Conversely, in the same 
report, they showed that in an atypically short phone interview, there 
was a tendency to underestimate the information given (2000). It was 
also discovered that with the ever-expanding cell-phone market, more 
adults that could be surveyed are not being interviewed42 (Kennedy, 
2007; Kanazawa, 2005; Lee, Hu & Toh, 2000). Some households may 
not have a traditional landline and rely solely on cell phones (Blumberg 
& Luke, 2007).  
 Physical inputs into the MRFSS can also be negatively biased by the 
structure of the survey itself (NRC, 2006).  It is common that 
individuals or groups of people not familiar with local fishing areas rent 
a private charter vessel that comes equipped with a captain and/or 
crew that are knowledgeable with the local fishing grounds (Committee 
on Fish Stock Assessment Methods et al., 1998; NRC, 2006).  This 
local expert can direct fishing efforts to remove the maximum allowable 
take (Hsu & Wilen, 1997).  Yet, the individuals on the charter vessels 
are not interviewed on the phone and will probably not be intercepted 
by the access-point interviewers (NRC, 2006).  It is the sole 
responsibility of the crew if they wish to have any type of 
documentation on board, e.g., a logbook, which discerns the catch and 
where it was caught (2006).   
c. Consumptive Commercial Use 
Commercial fishing has long been a resource exploited for both financial and 
personal gain (Thrush et al., 1998).  For instance, in Alaska it has been estimated 
that in the year 2001, commercial fishing landings netted $1.115 billion (Vaccaro & 
Sepez, 2003).  Commercial fishing, unlike recreational fishing, is highly regulated 
and closely monitored because of the rapid depletion that can occur due to 
advancements in technology43 (Jackson et al., 2001).
                                            
42 MRFSS protocol dictates that cell phones can’t be surveyed because they could have the potential 
for altering the locality parameter.  
43 Some of these technologies include more accurate “fish finders,” global positioning systems tied 
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d. Regulation 
The basis for commercial fishing regulation is rooted in the original 1976 
FCMA, in which the first steps in creating the Exclusive Economic Zone were 
established. The spirit of this act was to save the US commercial-fishing industry for 
US fisherman44 since up to that point, it had been exploited by foreign fleets (Hsu & 
Wilen, 1997).  Because of this, the US fishing fleets were looking to the US 
Government to subsidize their ability to create a larger and more modern fleet (Hsu 
& Wilen, 1997; King, 1995).  This action created two situations: 1) federally 
subsidized investment created a large domestic fishing fleet monopoly, and 2) the 
commercial industry had to accept federal fishery management (Hsu & Wilen, 1997). 
As a result of the government’s management plan, most of the fisheries in the 
US have a fixed number of vessels that are allowed to fish.  This helps ensure 
oversight of the US commercial fishing industry.  If there were no regulations (public 
or private) on how to administer fishing rights, then there would be significant 
potential for fishery access abuse (Hardin, 1968; Jackson et al., 2001).  Fishermen 
would gradually increase the amount of time they spent in the fishery.  In addition to 
the increase in time, there would be an increase in their ability to land fish through 
larger vessels or larger nets,45 and there would be an increase in the actual numbers 
of fishing vessels in the fishery until the fishery collapsed46 (Mullon, Freon & Curry, 
2005).  This was thought to be the case in the Caspian Sea, where the anchovy kilka 
(Clupeonella engrauliformis) fishery completely collapsed47 (Daskalov & Mamedov, 
2007).
                                            
44 The UN Law of the Sea Convention allowed for foreign fishing fleets to still operate in foreign 
waters until that country’s fishing fleet was built up enough to handle the fishing capacity.   
45 The effects on undesired species would be devastating because of by-catch. 
46 A fishery collapse can be defined as a depletion of stocks to the point at which the species can no 
longer support active recruitment. 
47 As a result of a fishery collapse, new or different species will flourish and drive the numbers of the 
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e. Non-consumptive, “Eco-tourism” Use 
The utilization of environmental resources with a perceptible goal of enjoying 
the surroundings without the removal or intentional destruction of endemic species 
can be simply summed up to “eco-tourism” (Suman, Shivlani, & Milon, 1999; 
Swarbrooke, Beard, Leckie, & Pomfret, 2003).  This is a growing, $110 billion (by 
some estimates) industry in the United States that shows no signs of slowing 
(Buckley, 2004; Johnson, 2002).  As individuals become more aware of their 
potential impact on the earth and its resources, there has been a paradigm shift to 
“tread lighter” when enjoying activities outside (Buckley, 2004).  These activities that 
are perceived to have a minor effect on the surroundings can, however, lead to an 
increase in undesired results (EcoHolidaying, 2008). 
 (1) Impacts of “Eco-tourism.” The general feeling regarding tourism 
based around the environment is typically viewed as having a positive 
influence on items such as conservation (Johnson, 2002). While this is 
the overall attitude, it should be noted that any increase in contact with 
the environment will cause a “foot print to be felt and left”48 
(Swarbrooke et al., 2003; Suman et al., 1999).  As such, there have 
been increasing numbers in the recreational boating community in 
activities such as whale watching, diving or cruising (Swarbrooke et al., 
2003). In an altruistic model, vessel operators that take part in such 
activities would only do so to maintain a living and would not cause a 
large impact to the environment.  In practice, however, this is not the 
case.  In the situation of dive boats, it can cost an operator $230,000 
for outfitting and an additional $83,000 a year for maintenance alone 
(Suman et al., 1999).  Such costs would motivate the owners to utilize 
their operation for as long as they can to recoup their expenses and to 
make a profit.  In other words, large overhead incentivizes owners to 
push use beyond resource capacity. 
f.  RFID Use in Resource Management 
What does all of this have to do with RFID? In light of the limitations outlined 
in the section on marine ecosystem management, it is clear that better systems of 
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completely re-invent ecosystem management, but the authors do feel that the 
application of RFID technology to the task of monitoring small vessels, especially as 
opposed to an alternative such as the vessel monitoring system (VMS) currently 
required of commercial fishing vessels,49 would create interesting and powerful 
possibilities with regard to data gathering. In particular, a registration system that 
incorporates RFID tagging of small vessels—and allows resource managers the 
ability to track and identify individual vessels in resource areas of interest—may 
enable regulators to produce a more accurate method for estimating recreational 
catch. For example, by correlating location and duration information for particular 
boats with calibrated landing data, RFID has the potential to be integrated into an 
ecosystem-based, marine spatial-planning framework.  
In summary, the intricacies of homeland security and resource management 
are, at best, complicated.  These issues involve many stakeholders who interact in a 
politically charged environment, and management problems are governed by 
multiple pieces of legislation.  In this environment, implementation of any system is 
difficult.  That being said, the use of radio frequency identification (RFID) technology, 
though not a “magic bullet,” has the potential to greatly improve management 
challenges with regard to small vessels.  RFID can provide greater access to 
information needed by decision-makers to help them provide security, safety, and 
resource management while posing less of a threat to the privacy of boat owners 
than both AIS and GPS monitoring. 
                                                                                                                                       
48 Climbers are now experiencing trash problems on Mount Everest. 
49 VMS will not be addressed significantly in this paper because it is considered to be specific to 
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II. Methods and Materials 
A. Beta Test  
1. Study Site 
To determine the feasibility of using an RFID system in this non-traditional 
method and to avoid wasting time and resources, the experiment was broken into 
two distinct segments.  The first test was relatively inexpensive and took place on 
top of a multi-story hotel in the Monterey Bay area.  If the system proved unlikely for 
success in this first test, then the airborne test would not have been pursued.  The 
following sections cover the pre-trial tower test and the main airborne test.   
The site selected for the pre-trial execution of testing RFID tags for their 
distance and speed capabilities was the rooftop of the Embassy Suites Hotel, 
located at the corner of Canyon Del Rey and Del Monte Avenue in Seaside, 
California. The site was chosen because the height at the tallest point of the 
structure provided as close of an analogous distance as possible, using 
Pythagorean’s Theory of a2 + b2 = c2, relative to any other location within the area. 
As such, the north- and southbound lanes of Highway 1 were used for their ability to 
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Figure 1. Graphical Representation of Paths Taken During Beta Test  
a. Environmental Conditions 
The test was conducted on May 12, 2009, from 1000–1600. The temperature 
was 63 degrees Fahrenheit. The sky was clear with no cloud cover, and a 5- to 6-
knot wind was coming from the northwest. 
b. Equipment 
Savi Technologies, a division of Lockheed Martin, supplied engineering 
support in the form of multiple configurations of antennas, six active RFID tags, and 
an electrical engineer. The engineer had a personal laptop that he used to analyze 
real-time data from the RFID tags and antennas.  
c. Antennas 
Various standard Yagi directional hand-held aerial antennas (shown behind 
the interrogator module in Figure 2) were used opportunistically around the 
northwest corner of the building to obtain the best signal (see Figure 1).  The 
antennas connected to the interrogator module via coaxial cables that were matched 





do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 33 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
 
Figure 2. Photograph of One of the Antennas Used in the Test 
d. Tags 
The tags (see Figure 3) supplied by Savi Technology50 were model ST-654 
active RFID tags, which can operate in either beacon or poll mode.  In beacon 
mode, the tags will continually broadcast their serial number at pre-determined 
intervals (usually every 10 seconds).  In poll mode, the tags are “awakened” by a 
signal from the interrogator, and then they broadcast their serial number.  In poll 
mode, because the serial number is broadcasted only when interrogated, battery life 
is extended, and the threat to privacy is reduced. In both configurations, the tags 
operate at 433.92 MHz.  Six RFID tags were placed strategically around a blue 1999 
Ford F-150 (see Figure 4) in the following manner: one on the rooftop horizontally, 
perpendicular to the vehicle’s centerline; one on the dashboard horizontally, 
perpendicular to the vehicle’s centerline; one on the inside of the rear windscreen 
vertically, perpendicular to the vehicle’s centerline; one on the inside of the tailgate 
vertically, perpendicular to the vehicle’s centerline; one placed opportunistically on 
the dashboard and allowed to “free float” as the vehicle was in motion; and one 
placed opportunistically within the cab of the vehicle, and allowed to “float freely” as 
the vehicle was in motion.
                                            
50 Savi Technology was chosen because they are a prominent RFID manufacturer with ample DoD 





do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 34 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
 
Figure 3. A Photo of Some of the Active RFID Tags  
 
 
Figure 4. An Example of How the RFID Tags Were Placed   
(Note: This tag was placed on the roof of the vehicle  and secured with  
Duct Tape.) 
e. Real-time Tracking 
Two hand-held Garmin GPS units (60CSx and eTrex Vista HCx) were placed 
within the tagged vehicle. These provided both a redundant tracking of the vehicle’s 
movements, relative to a GPS waypoint taken from the northwest corner of the 
Embassy Suites, as well as the ability to correlate tracking waypoints to specific 









The antennas and RFID tags were “ground-truthed” with a course that was in 
a straight line with the best line of sight. The vehicle then travelled at given intervals 
of approximately 100 feet to investigate the maximum distance the tags could be 
read from the rooftop of the Embassy Suites (see Figure 1). 
b. Static Distance 
A second static test was devised as a means to investigate whether, at a 
distance greater than 800 feet, the antennas would have trouble reading the tags 
when in the proximity of other vehicles that were not tagged. That is, what would be 
the effect on the readability of the tags when surrounded by potential “noise”? As a 
result, a busy parking lot was chosen—with a clear line of sight—that was 
approximately 825 feet from the antenna (see Figure 1).  
c. Dynamic Speed and Distance 
A route was chosen along the Highway 1 northbound lane between the 
Fremont Boulevard entrance and Canyon Del Rey exit to provide for distances 
greater than 1,000 feet and allow for vehicle speeds to be constant at 55 miles per 
hour (see Figure 1).  
3. Data Processing 
The Garmin GPS files and RFID tag-read information were imported into 
Excel and correlated to extrapolate time to location and the RFID tag number. The 
Garmin GPS files and tag-read information were processed in ArcGIS 9.3 for 
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Figure 5. Graphical Display of All RFID Tags and Their Locations 
B. Over-Flight Test 
1. Study Site 
The site selected for the over-flight was the Monterey Bay Marine Sanctuary, 
located in Monterey, California. The site was selected for the protection that the 
Monterey Bay could afford a small vessel from the influence of the California Long 
Shore current and any large ground swell that may have propagated offshore due to 
storm activity. The physical location for the over-flight was set to be five nautical 
miles offshore to comply with Federal Aviation Administration regulations regarding 
Class C controlled airspace around an airport, and to be well enough out in the 
Monterey Bay Marine Sanctuary to be able to fly below the 1,000-foot minimum 
threshold set by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s (NOAA) 
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Figure 6. Graphical Representation of the Over-flight in the  
Monterey Bay Marine Sanctuary 
a. Environmental Conditions 
The over-flight was conducted on May 25, 2009. The temperature was 65 
degrees Fahrenheit. The sky was overcast and assumed to have a ceiling of 1,500 
feet. There was a 5- to 10-knot wind coming from the northwest. There was a 
perceptible ground swell that was approximately four to six feet in height, with a 
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2. Equipment 
a. NOAA Research Vessel Heron 
The NOAA R/V Heron is a 19-foot Boston Whaler. It has a composite 
fiberglass hull. It was outfitted with an Evinrude outboard, 75-horsepower, 2-stroke 
engine. It has an open-deck configuration, i.e., no enclosed super structures.  
b. NOAA Aircraft Twin Otter 
The NOAA aircraft is a 52-foot Dehavilland Twin Otter outfitted with twin 
engine turboprops. It was chosen as the desired platform due to its ability to 
maintain a stable attitude while flying at slow speeds (i.e., the slowest it can maintain 
steady and controlled flight is approximately 80 knots).  
c. RFID Antenna and Tags 
The same RFID antenna and tags that were used for the beta test, were used 
in the over-flight.  
RFID Tags: One tag was carried aboard the aircraft to ensure the antenna 
was working and reading correctly. The rest of the tags were attached throughout 
the vessel. Two tags were placed horizontally on the port side, parallel to the 
vessel’s centerline (one forward close to the bow and one aft between the beam and 
transom). Two tags were placed horizontally on the starboard side, parallel to the 
vessel’s centerline (one forward close to the bow and one aft between the beam and 
transom). Two tags were placed vertically on the helm station (port and starboard) at 
its highest point parallel to the vessel’s centerline.  
RFID Antenna: The antenna was used opportunistically on the starboard side 
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d. Real-time Tracking 
One hand-held Garmin eTrex Vista HCx GPS unit was placed on the tagged 
vessel to provide real-time tracking of the vessel’s movements relative to the other 
Garmin 60CSx GPS unit aboard the aircraft. Each GPS was used to correlate 
against the RFID tags. Each GPS unit was set to record position, altitude, true 
heading, and speed every five seconds. 
e. Over-flight Methods 
The NOAA R/V Heron was left on station to conduct a drift study. It was noted 
that it was drifting at approximately 0.3 knots and would suffice as an analog for a 
recreational vessel engaged in fishing operations (see Figure 6). The outboard 
engine was left running due to mechanical issues. The Twin Otter conducted a 
series of over-flights such that the starboard aperture would always be facing the 
Heron. The Twin Otter was given a total of 1/2 a nautical mile on either side of the 
Heron to make its pass and circle back. The Twin Otter conducted 21 passes and 
flew varying speeds and altitudes throughout the exercise, with no less than a 500-
foot floor and no more than a 1,000-foot ceiling (see Figure 6).  
f. Data Processing 
The Garmin GPS files and RFID tag-read information were imported into 
Microsoft Excel and correlated to extrapolate time to location and RFID tag number. 
The Garmin GPS files and tag-read information were processed in ArcGIS 9.3 for 
analysis (see Figure 6). Also, the same data was processed using Garmin’s 
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III. Results of the Feasibility Experiment 
A. Experiment Limitations 
Under budget and timeframe restrictions, the experiment naturally had some 
limitations and artificialities that may not necessarily reflect real-world 
circumstances.  For the individual tests discussed below, these limitations will be 
further explained.  However, it should be noted that the goal was to prove feasibility 
of the technology in an airborne setting.  The goal was not to test a large-scale 
employment of this system with numerous assets.  That experiment requires an in-
depth pilot study.     
Other limitations are those of the technology itself.  This experiment tested 
RFID in an environment for which it was not designed.  Thus, the system has not 
been optimized for use in open-air and open-water situations.  It can be expected 
that this limitation will diminish over the next decade as RFID technology improves 
with increased use by both industry and government. 
Finally, every effort was taken to position the aircraft and the vessel in order 
to optimize the reception of the tags.  This was accomplished not to skew or bias the 
data, but to ensure that sufficient quantities of data could be collected and analyzed.  
The RFID system itself was not modified; rather, the aircraft and vessel were 
positioned for maximum detection range.  
B. RFID Long-Range Tower Feasibility Results 
1. Test Objective  
The objective was to test whether the system could successfully interrogate 
RFID tags from at least 1,000 feet slant-range distance from reader to tags.  Since 
RFID has traditionally been used in warehousing and inventory management, the 
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unknown.  One thousand feet was the threshold, because patrol aircraft often 
operate at or above 1,000 feet due to Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) 
restrictions and must obtain special permissions to descend lower. 
2. Limitations of the Tower Test 
Under the given conditions, the tower test could not fully replicate the 
upcoming flight test.  The most prominent limitation was that the RFID reader was 
mounted on the fixed asset (the tower), and the tags were mounted on the moving 
asset (the truck).  In contrast, in the flight test, the RFID reader was mounted on the 
moving aircraft and the stationary vessel carried the RFID tags. 
Second, the tower test had to deal with the potential interference from 
communication antennas on the roof of the hotel and with ground clutter on the 
street surfaces below.  Though not measured or verified, the potential existed for 
electromagnetic interference from the high-power receiver and transmitters used by 
Embassy Suites.  The type and frequency of the arrays are not known, but analysis 
does not reveal any negative impact on the RFID readings.  Also, the many flat 
surfaces of roads and buildings near the truck with the RFID tags may have 
interfered with the datum transmission, though again this was unmeasured and did 
not seem to negatively affect the readings. 
3. Tower Test—Runs 1 & 2 
With five tags mounted on various locations inside and outside the cab, the 
truck was slowly driven along a street vectoring northeast directly away from the 
tower.  During this first run, radio contact between the driver and the tower allowed 
the tower crew to request the truck to stop when the RFID reader and antenna 
needed adjustment.  The truck was driven away from the tower in increments of 
approximately 50 yards, after which it would pull over to the curb to wait for 
permission to advance.  A handheld GPS receiver onboard the truck recorded the 
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could no longer acquire a positive read from any of the five RFID tags.  At that point, 
the truck driver performed a U-turn and advanced back directly toward the tower in 
the same 50-yard increments.  Using this method, multiple successful tag readings 
were captured, with distances out to nearly 2,000 feet.  Figure 7 details the various 
locations of the truck for both Run 1 and Run 2. 
Run 2 was performed in order to obtain additional information about the 
system’s performance.  A northeast direction was chosen because it offered a clear 
view from the tower (as opposed to the path in Run 1), and there was a higher 
density of moving vehicles and potential electromagnetic reflections.  A four-lane 
highway and the Pacific Ocean were backdrops in this test.  The geographic 
limitations of the roadways restrained Run 2’s distance to only about 1,100 feet, 
though additional tag reads at these distances continued to support our hypothesis. 
 
Figure 7. Successful RFID Reads for Tower Tests 1 & 2  
(Note: The tower is in the center) 
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4. Tower Test—Run 3 
With the first two runs showing promising range results with relatively static 
tags, the third test evaluated the system with a moving target.  The truck was driven 
on side roads and the four-lane Highway 1, located to the west of the tower.  Due to 
the geography of the roadways and the newly discovered range of the tags, only a 
limited window on the highway offered promising results.  Several runs were made 
at various speeds, with the truck traveling both north- and southbound.  Over a 30-
minute period, six passes were made at speeds of 30, 45, and 55 miles per hour.  
Between passes, the RFID reader and antenna were adjusted in an attempt to 
improve reception range.  Throughout all of Run 3, only one tag was successfully 
identified and on only one occasion.  Figure 8 shows the point (most northwesterly 
pin) at which the tag was identified at a range of approximately 1,400 feet while the 
truck was heading southeast at 56 miles per hour, or 49 knots.   
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This one successful tag reading did prove that the concept would work with a 
moving tag.  However, one successful reading over six passes is a lackluster 
outcome, and it is doubtful that a monitoring agency would find these results 
acceptable for similar usage.  Since the objective of the tower test was only to prove 
the concept before an airborne test was launched, the authors did not collect 
sufficient data to support or reject this particular feasibility test. 
5. Summary of Long-range Tower Test 
Since the one reading at 49 knots was approximately 50% of the normal 
operating speed of the aircraft that was planned to be used in the airborne test, the 
risk of continuing the feasibility experiment was considered moderate.  However, 
because the static tests in the first two runs revealed ranges that exceeded the test 
threshold by nearly 100%, the tower test was deemed successful. Thus, the flight 
test was scheduled. 
As stated previously, it is not the intent of this writing to conclude the 
feasibility of using RFID to track moving vehicles on the ground via a reader on a 
tower.  Since the tower tests were used for risk-reduction to support the upcoming 
airborne test, the authors did not collect sufficient information to uphold or refute the 
feasibility of this particular application of RFID technology. 
C. Airborne RFID Feasibility Test Results 
1. Purpose of the Airborne RFID Test 
The core of this feasibility writing is based on the airborne test in which an 
RFID interrogator is placed on an aircraft to identify RFID-tagged vessels on the 
water’s surface below.  The test was designed to answer the core question of 
whether or not a commercially available RFID system could perform this task at 
ranges outside the typical limitations of the technology.  A threshold of 1,000 feet 
was set since most coastal patrol aircraft have a minimum operating limitation of 
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2. Test Objective 
The objective of this test was to determine if commercially available 
technology (which is available at the time of this writing) can be installed onboard 
patrol aircraft with minimum or no airframe modification and can be used to identify 
active-RFID tagged surface vessels during routine patrol operations.  If feasible, 
research and development of the RFID technology is not required; thus, the 
acquisition, deployment, and sustainment can be accelerated to meet current 
requirements for vessel patrol and can be monitored by local and/or Federal 
Government agencies.  
3. Limitations of the Airborne Test 
This experiment was not a full-scale pilot study. As such, it was conducted 
with only one aircraft and one vessel in open-harbor waters.  This was intentionally 
arranged to have as few variables as possible for the data analysis.  Inferences 
about the feasibility of such technology in environments other than this experiment 
cannot be confidently made without further study on a larger scale and with 
additional resources. 
Because the aircraft belonged to the National Oceanographic and 
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and time was limited for the experimental 
equipment design, the aircraft was not modified for optimum use of the RFID 
system.  By typical aviation standards, the antenna installation was not compliant for 
constant usage.  The full effects of this sub-optimal arrangement have not been 
studied and will not be addressed in this report.  However, the system as installed 
did support our hypothesis with range readings well past the threshold limit. 
A third limitation is that of any electromagnetic interferences that may have 
occurred between the aircraft systems and the RFID system.  Before takeoff, the 
aircrew tested the instrumentation of the aircraft with the RFID system both on and 
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However, the crew wisely elected to avoid Instrument Meteorological Conditions 
(IMC) while the RFID system was powered.  As outlined in the Acquisition Strategy 
in Appendix A, the procuring agency for such a system must ensure that thorough 
electromagnetic spectrum interference testing be completed by the aircraft 
manufacturer or responsible agent.  Additionally, the RFID system developer must 
ensure that the system’s detection range capabilities are not severely hampered by 
the aircraft’s electromagnetic field. 
Analysis and testing for any possible electromagnetic interference between 
the outboard motor and the RFID tags were not performed.  In order to identify any 
potential negative influences on the RFID tags mounted at various locations on the 
vessel, this type of testing should be accomplished in any future pilot studies.    
D. Analysis of Data Collected 
1. Vessel Path and Data 
The vessel was launched into the Pacific Ocean one hour before aircraft 
takeoff and was positioned via GPS at a point five nautical miles off the coast of the 
Monterey Harbor.  Five miles was required due to the Class C controlled airspace 
that the aircraft had to avoid.  Figure 9 outlines the vessel’s path to and from the test 
site.  The green diamond indicates the position of the vessel during the start of the 
test, and the red diamond indicates the vessel’s position at the end of the test.  With 
ocean and wind currents, the vessel drifted at an average of 0.52 knots per hour, 
with one reposition occurring at approximately halfway through the flight test.  The 
distance between the two diamonds in Figure 9 is 0.5 nautical miles.  This drift has 
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Figure 9. Vessel Location in the Pacific Ocean 
(0.5 nm between diamonds)  
(Imagery from Google Earth®) 
2. Post-flight Data Analysis 
The aircraft and the vessel were individually equipped with Garmin handheld 
GPS units, which logged the location, time, and altitude of the units every five 
seconds.  Before the test, both units were time synchronized with a host laptop 
computer to ensure all time readings would be consistent.  Figure 10 outlines the 
aircraft and vessel positions during the test, and Table 1 summarizes the 21 passes 
made by the aircraft. 
 
Figure 10. Aircraft Path (thin black line)  
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Using Pythagorean’s Theorem, the slant range was calculated for each 
pass’s successful reading of the RFID tags.  Read range is the delta between the 
two vehicles on a flat plane.  Slant range takes into account the altitude of the 
aircraft and, thus, represents the true distance between the vessel and the aircraft.  
The bottom row of Table 1 shows the averages of the respective columns. 
Table 1. Summary of Aircraft Passes and Reading Ranges 
 
Every successful pass resulted in a reading slant range over 1,000 feet.  The 
minimum successful slant-range reading was 1,587 feet, and the maximum was 
3,220 feet.  Due to cloud cover, the aircraft was not able to climb more than 900 feet 
above the vessel, but the slant-range readings more than compensate for this 
limitation.  In six of the passes (28.5%), no tags were successfully read.  The 
parameters for these passes do not differ significantly from the other passes, and 
each falls near (both above and below) the average parameters for all 21 passes.  In 
nine of the passes, there was more than one successful read per pass, with a 
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them were readings from different tags on the vessel.  The remaining passes 
showed multiple readings of the same tag during each pass. 
The average pass duration was 1 minute, 27 seconds.  A pass is defined as 
the time between: 1) the point at which the aircraft completes its turn and points 
toward the vessel for the interrogation run, and 2) the point at which the aircraft has 
completed its over-flight and begins to turn away from the interrogation heading.  
Pass duration obviously depends on aircraft speed and wind speed.  Accounting for 
wind, the average speed of the aircraft was 92.9 knots during the 21 passes. 
Figure 11 outlines the location of the aircraft when successful tag readings 
were made.  1,000-foot concentric rings have been overlaid to show the approximate 
range of the readings, though the rings are centered on a point in the water that 
represents the median location of the vessel during the duration of the test.  The 
small fisheye dots represent the position of the aircraft when the vessel tags were 
positively identified. 
 
Figure 11. Overlay of 1,000-foot Concentric Rings and Location of  
Aircraft During Successful Tag Readings  
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The altitudes and speeds of each pass are graphed in Figure 12.  The data 
does not reveal any limitations or preferences to a specific altitude as long as the 
aircraft was within the recorded maximum slant-range limitation of 2,129 feet, as 
seen in Table 1.  Additionally, Figure 12 shows the spectrum of airspeeds for which 
the tests were conducted.   
 
Figure 12. Altitude and Ground Speed of the Aircraft During Passes 
The aircraft passes were performed mostly in an east/west orientation, with 
the vessel always pointing to the north.  Figure 13 details the approach headings for 
all passes.  Also detailed on the right side of Figure 13 is a breakout of all slant-
range averages that were realized in the test.  The minimum range of 1,600 feet and 
the mean range of 2,129 feet both far exceed the test objective of 1,000-feet slant 
range, resulting in a successful test. 
 
Figure 13. Left: True Headings Flown by Aircraft  
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Regression analysis was performed between various data fields in Table 1.  A 
summary of the R2 values are shown in Table 2.  Only test six revealed any 
significant correlation between the variables at a 95% confidence level.  The slower 
the aircraft flew through the RFID tag interrogation range, the more time was 
available for the system to obtain a positive reading on one or more tags.  While this 
finding is hardly groundbreaking, it does show that with the RFID tag configuration 
used a threshold airspeed exists that cannot be exceeded because the aircraft will 
fly in and out of range before the RFID tag can successfully respond.  Figure 14 
graphically depicts this trend.  RFID tags with beacon rates less than every ten 
seconds will allow a faster aircraft to successfully read the tag because the quantity 
of tag transmissions increases per aircraft pass. 
Table 2. Summary of Regression Analysis Performed 
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E. Summary of Results 
Despite electromagnetic ground clutter and potential interference from high-
power communication antennas on the roof of the tower, the RFID system 
performed well and successfully recorded 111 interrogations of the tags during the 
tower test.  Out of these, the maximum range observed was nearly 2,000 feet, and 
one reading was at 1,400 feet while the tag was moving at 49 knots. 
The subsequent flight test revealed that the RFID system onboard the aircraft 
successfully identified RFID tagged vessels on the water’s surface.  Of all the 
passes, 71.5% returned successful, with multiple tag readings that exceeded the 
1,000-foot test objective by 59%–222%.  Agencies that would use this Airborne 
RFID system could successfully conduct over-flight monitoring while complying with 
the 1,000-foot minimum altitude threshold set by the National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration for marine sanctuaries and the Federal Aviation 
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IV. Feasibility Test Conclusions and Discussion  
A. Hypothesis Supported 
As explained in the previous section, the commercially available RFID system 
was successfully tested in two incremental steps in order to assess the feasibility of 
outdoor and long-range usage for aircraft implementation.  The first test was 
conducted from the top of a multi-story hotel, with the tags mounted on a moving 
vehicle on the streets below.  Despite electromagnetic ground clutter and potential 
interference from high-power communication antennas on the roof of the tower, the 
RFID system performed well and successfully recorded multiple tags on 111 
occasions.  The maximum range recorded was nearly 2,000 feet, and, on average, 
the distance read during this initial test was 982 feet (see Figure 15). Interestingly, 
one particular reading was at 1,400 feet while the tag was moving at 49 knots. 
 
Figure 15. The Range of Readings from the Initial Test was  
Approximately 850 to 1,200 Feet 
During the subsequent flight test, the aircraft was flown over the vessel 21 
times at various altitudes and speeds.  71.5% of the passes returned successfully, 
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59% and up to 222%.51  From this data, we can conclude that it is possible to read a 
commercial off-the-shelf RFID tag mounted on a small vessel using a commercial 
off-the-shelf RFID interrogator mounted on aircraft.  With tag detection ranges out to 
3,220 feet (4,414 feet with outliers included52), and an average detection range of 
2,129 feet (2,105 feet with outliers included, see Figure 16), we can also conclude 
that an aerial RFID system has significant potential to support waterway patrol 
operations from airborne assets. Thus, our findings support the concept of 
integrating RFID-based assets into small-vessel monitoring systems.  
 
Figure 16. Range of Readings From the Over-flight Test 
(with outliers included) 
1. Implications of Findings 
Chokepoints, which are defined here as physical restrictions through which all 
vehicles must pass, are found in nearly all land-based transportation environments.  
Trains run on continuous chokepoints because the rails allow for no deviation in 
                                            
51 The threshold value of 1,000 feet divided by the minimum & maximum slant range observed (1,587 
and 3,220 feet). 
52 Outliers were included in the box plots (see Figures 15 and 16) as a function of attempting to 
capture all of the data. The outliers were recorded during aircraft over-flight setup runs but were 
excluded in other calculations because the official over-flight tests with specific speeds and altitudes 
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course, and automobiles follow streets and pass through intersections.  Even the 
seemingly open sky is separated into precise corridors and layers of airspace that 
are constantly monitored, and most aircraft must eventually land in places that are 
also monitored.  In aquatic environments, however, physical chokepoints only occur 
at places such as industrial complexes, harbor entrances, canals, straights, and river 
mouths. As with other transportation environments (as noted by Crofts, 2007), these 
chokepoints are ideal points to place monitoring systems. However, unlike the other 
transportation environments mentioned, these chokepoints represent a relativity low 
percentage of the 10,75853 nautical miles of coastline in the United States (“United 
States,” 2009).  The monitoring of waterways, therefore, requires a system that can 
be used over long ranges and is flexible enough to work in various environments 
and coastal conditions. 
The authors hypothesized that aircraft equipped with RFID readers could 
meet these needs. This feasibility study proved that commercially available RFID 
equipment can be used to successfully identify surface vessels from airborne 
platforms that operate within speed and altitude envelopes similar to the Dehavilland 
DHC-6 aircraft.  Most law-enforcement aircraft (both fixed wing and rotary) fall within 
this speed range, as do many Unmanned Aerial Vehicles or Systems (UAV, UAS).  
In combination with land-based, RFID-monitored chokepoints, the ability to patrol 
even the most remote areas with RFID-enabled aircraft makes RFID a viable 
suggestion for maximizing information and coverage per unit of monitoring effort, per 
dollar spent.  
The RFID system used in this test is commercially available. Government 
procurement would require no research and development of the technology—only 
modifications of settings and mounts—and such systems could be used on-board 
                                            
53 The coastline is defined as the land bordering an area of water that stretches out 12 nm to the US 





do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 58 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
any pre-existing patrol/rescue aircraft.  Aircraft modification would be minimal since 
receiving antennas can be made to fit into a variety of forms at a low cost. 
The authors are not advocating immediate adoption and procurement of an 
airborne RFID system. Rather, they are suggesting that such a system at least 
merits further examination in various conditions, equipment types, and quantities, 
and, ideally, the initiation of a pilot study.   
However, it should be mentioned that the limited results of this study suggest 
that if a system like the one tested were employed onboard an existing airframe with 
flight characteristics similar to the DHC-6 and if RFID tags were deployed onto 
vessels of interest, then an agency could potentially identify those vessels with this 
system, even in an unmodified state.   
B. Study Limitations and Artificialities  
The above scenario is predicated on the weather, equipment, and angular 
conditions tested in this feasibility experiment.  Thus, inferences about how well the 
system will perform outside the tested parameters cannot be confidently made;  
however, the system did prove robust enough to perform in the physically and 
electronically cluttered setting on top of the hotel in the tower test and was able to 
overcome ad hoc aircraft mounting procedures and interrogation methods in the 
flight test.  These limitations can be verified or ignored when additional large-scale 
testing of the system is accomplished.  Still, there are limitations and artificialities 
that deserve mention in this study.  
The first limitation was the fact that only one vessel was available for testing.  
Additional vessels of various sizes, hull types, engines, and speeds should be tested 
to ensure that the RFID system would work equally well with each permutation.  
Having multiple RFID tags on the one vessel increased the quantity of data 
collected; however, this multiplicity cannot be used to replicate the many variables 
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Stagnant data is a second limitation of the system as tested.  Immediately 
upon successful interrogation of a tag, the system added an entry to the database.  
However, since the system was not connected to a data transmitter, only the aircrew 
had access to the information.  Moments later, the vessel would be in a different 
location, and the data collected would become increasingly useless.  If the goal of 
the aircrew were to collect a snapshot in time of vessel readings for historical 
purposes, then this setup would be sufficient.  However, it is more likely that 
agencies would prefer to know in real-time the location of vessels and, as a result, 
would want access to the interrogation database.  Any means of data 
communication would be sufficient for this purpose, and minimal bandwidth would be 
required.  Over the course of the one-hour mission, the system recorded 408 rows of 
data, arranged in 45 columns that ranged from tag serial number to tag battery 
status to tag humidity-sensor status.  The file size was only 116 kilobytes (KB) and 
would not require any encryption since no personally identifiable data was included 
in the tag readings.  Transmitting the interrogation data to a real-time data-analysis 
network would allow agencies to respond to trends or findings without having to wait 
for the aircraft to land and manually offload the information. 
Coupled with the above limitation is the fact that the RFID system is not a 
location-detecting system.  Like most radio frequency emitters, RFID is omni-
directional and does not use any space- or land-based navigation signals for 
orientation or alignment.  When a tag is successfully interrogated, the time of the 
event is recorded, but the distance and location are not known.  Because the 
average slant reading range in this feasibility test was 2,129 feet, a successful 
reading meant that the tag was somewhere inside an invisible sphere with a radius 
of 2,129 feet and centered around the RFID tag itself.  To build a composite diagram 
of vessel locations, the aircraft’s position must be known, constantly logged, and 
correlated to the RFID system’s database.  This can be accomplished manually—as 
was performed in a spreadsheet on the flight data in this feasibility test—or 
automatically if GPS or INS data were to be fed into a common database with the 
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aforementioned communication link, and the ground agency could correlate the 
RFID readings with the aircraft positional data.  However it is accomplished, the two 
system clocks need to be slaved to a common time signal to ensure the most 
accurate data is documented. 
The successful discovery of RFID’s potential for long-range vessel 
interrogation creates a complimentary and problematic issue that must be 
understood and accounted for in vessel-interrogation sorties.  Because the RFID 
system is omni-directional, as mentioned above, it is also ambiguous as to the exact 
distance from the interrogator to the RFID tag.  For example, if a tag were to have a 
maximum reading range of 2,129 feet, then the aircraft could fly directly overhead 
the tagged vessel and get one reading.  Imagining the invisible RFID sphere around 
the vessel, the aircraft would come in tangential contact with the sphere at exactly 
one point, 2,129 feet away from the vessel.  The tangential point represents the 
vessel’s location to a high degree of certainty because interrogations at any other 
points on the sphere are not possible due to the 2,129-foot range limitation.  
Conversely, if that same aircraft were to fly at 1,000 feet above the tagged vessel, 
then the aircraft’s geometric plane of flight would intersect into the invisible sphere 
and inject a circular area of probability in which the vessel could be located.  In this 
situation, the aircraft would not be able to determine the exact location of the vessel 
and would only be able to assume that it is located no more than 2,129 feet away, 
but it may also be much closer.  Realistically, the maximum detection range of 
individual tags cannot be known and is likely not a constant value over time due to 
atmospheric and electronic fluctuations.  Thus, the airborne RFID system as tested 
cannot be used to verify the precise position of vessels on the surface. It should be 
noted, however, that the authors have considered the possibility that exact positional 
data could be gained with the use of a small rotary UAV/UAS by hovering at low 
altitude over a vessel of interest.  For example, if a sighted vessel was not supposed 
to be operating in a certain area, and enforcement officials needed to determine 
definitively what the position of that vessel was in relation to the prohibited area, 
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enough to be a safe distance away from the vessel, but low enough to consider the 
aircraft’s position the same as the vessel under it. The UAS could document the 
vessel’s presence at that location and at that time with photographic and RFID 
evidence. 
An additional artificiality of this feasibility test was the fact that the 
interrogation system and the antenna were mounted ad hoc in the aircraft without 
engineering analysis of any airframe properties that may have impeded successful 
interrogation events.  Having little time and money to produce this experiment, the 
authors could not obtain permission in time to rigidly mount the antenna either inside 
or outside the aircraft.  Rather, it was hand-held during the sortie and placed next to 
an observation window on the starboard side.  Commercial 433 MHz antennas are 
available for aviation use and could be mounted in multiple configurations or 
quantities to maximize the detection capability of the airframe.  More robust testing 
with rigid-mounted antennas would alleviate the unknown implications of the hand-
held performance in this feasibility test. 
As outlined in Chapter I, the use of RFID for vessel interrogation must be 
coupled with additional sensors or detectors if 100% identification is required.  If an 
aircraft were to overfly 100 vessels, this study concludes that 71 of them would be 
successfully interrogated54 in the first pass.  If there were only one pass, the 
remaining 29 vessels would not be identified and logged.  For some agencies, this 
percentage is wholly acceptable for a general survey that contributes to long-term 
trend analysis in which complete accuracy is not necessary. It would also be 
acceptable if RFID were being used to determine the identification and status of 
vessels that were seen visually and that were actively targeted for reading. 
Conversely, for scenarios requiring more accurate read-rates, the current RFID 
system either needs to be tailored more specifically for the marine and aerial 
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environment—and read-rates improved to approach 100%—or it must be coupled 
with a complimentary monitoring system.  With such a system, any vessel that is 
overflown but not successfully interrogated by the RFID system will alert the aircrew 
of a vessel that has either no tag, a faulty tag, or needs to be re-interrogated.  If the 
density of vessels on the surface is low, then human eyes in manned aircraft may 
suffice for comparison of visual count and RFID readings.  However, this is not 
optimal, especially when visibility is low, and the aircrew is busy with normal aircraft 
navigation and piloting duties.  Potential complimentary systems could be based 
upon infrared camera technology, low-power radar, or sonar.  A future study of the 
application of Airborne RFID will reveal strengths and weaknesses of each 
candidate system.  
C. Concepts of Operations (CONOPS) and Employment 
As mentioned in the Introduction, the first requisite of RFID CONOPS is the 
requirement for all small-vessel owners to mount an RFID-based license tag at an 
optimal location on their vessel.  This is an inexpensive proposition, estimated at 
around or less than $45–$77 per vessel.  This is also minimally invasive since the 
PII corresponding to these licenses would necessarily be maintained as a network-
accessible database by a single agency, with controlled and selective access by 
other agencies that have a need to know.  The establishment and management of 
such a database would be the most costly component of this system but may be 
offset by the alternate uses such a database may offer. 
Subsequently, the authors envision an expansion of a system in which fixed 
RFID interrogators are used to monitor bottleneck waterways for anomalies.  
Combined with other surveillance technology—which can independently detect 
vessels and investigate negative tag responses—the fixed system would create a 
persistent monitoring capability in highly sensitive areas.   
For occasions when information is needed on vessels that are not in the 
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antennas to conform to a uniform, modular, open-architecture mount that would be 
universal to all manned and un-manned aircraft employed by the DHS, DoD, and 
NOAA.  As with the fixed systems, the mounted RFID hardware would be relatively 
inexpensive and non-developmental.  As with the fixed system, the more costly 
element in this aerial system would be the development of the database interface 
that would allow real-time interaction between the aircraft and the database.  
D. Areas for Future and Additional Research 
The aforementioned limitations and artificialities of this airborne RFID 
feasibility study all point to the need for additional studies to be completed before an 
agency wholly adopts the system as a viable solution for vessel monitoring.  We 
have proven only that RFID can be used at acceptable ranges in an air-to-surface 
arena; a large-scale pilot study would expand the understanding of airborne RFID’s 
abilities, limitations, and applications.  A pilot study should consist of numerous 
vessels in various locations that are allowed to operate normally over the period of 
weeks or months.  During that time, various aircraft missions could be generated 
and flown into the tagged vessel’s area(s) of operation.  Ideally, the missions would 
be performed at various times of the day, in diverse weather and sea conditions, and 
over various geographical locations.  Other potential variables to be tested would be 
antenna types and placements, tag manufacturers, operating frequencies, response 
settings, and aircraft-operating envelopes.  The overall goal would be to examine 
trends in tag-detection levels and error-reading rates.   
Additionally, optimal over-flight patterns, routes, and tactics could be identified 
for aircraft usage and aircrew orientation training upon deployment of the airborne 
RFID system.  To support a pilot study, agencies could request RFID manufactures 
to enter into Cooperative Research and Development Agreements (CRADAs), in 
which various RFID tags and interrogators could be trial-tested and compared.   
A second area of further research would revolve around meshing the 
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in the limitations section above, the RFID tags only transmit the serial number of the 
tag, and no personally identifiable information can be collected in the airborne RFID 
database—much like a license plate on an automobile typically reveals nothing 
about the driver’s personal information.  Ideally, this serial number will be logged into 
an RFID tag-registration database—much like a Department of Motor Vehicles’ 
(DMV) registration database.  The vessel owner’s information could be synchronized 
with the aircraft’s interrogation database, if the need were to arise.  Additionally, this 
registration information could be linked or shared with other government or law-
enforcement agency databases to enable national security goals or analysis.  Law-
abiding vessel owners would likely never be matched or correlated in this manner. 
However, if national security agencies needed information about particular 
individuals of interest, the RFID database would supply additional information about 
the habits and locations of vessel(s) owned by those individuals.   
Airborne RFID could potentially be linked into a network of sensors that 
constantly monitor national coastal areas and harbors. Additional studies could 
examine how airborne RFID and land-based RFID chokepoint stations (Crofts, 
2007), traffic cameras, AIS, and other monitoring technologies could be meshed into 
the same database to develop composite situation and trend pictures of vessel 
movements and patterns.  Emerging advances in payload and mission duration of 
UAVs and UASs reveal that airborne RFID could be mounted to a loitering UAS that 
constantly monitors coastlines and transmits readings back to ground stations or up 
to satellite receivers.  Thus, airborne RFID could play a pivotal role in national-
security sensor fusion, intelligence collection, and trend analysis. 
Finally, additional research should be applied to the use of less expensive 
RFID equipment.  As technology constantly improves, so does the potential for 
smaller, lighter, and more powerful RFID tags to be used for airborne applications.  
As the price of each tag decreases, the ability for an agency to procure more tags for 
more vessels increases. Thus, any previous usage and implementation issues due 
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Further, the range of passive RFID tags may improve sufficiently that they 
could replace active RFID tags for airborne RFID application.  Currently, passive 
RFID tags do not have enough transmission power to reach out more than a few 
feet.  This is because they utilize power inducted from the interrogation signal to 
retransmit their serial number.  Because magnetic induction replaces the battery 
found in active tags, passive tags are smaller and much less expensive.  Future 
advancements in either passive tag design or in interrogator waveform patterns or 
techniques could bring passive tags into the Airborne RFID arena. 
E. Summary of Conclusions 
With the hypothesis confirmed and the feasibility test showing that RFID can 
indeed be used onboard an aircraft to interrogate and monitor surface vessels, 
agencies can now plan scenarios for a pilot study and future vessel-monitoring 
operations using this commercially available technology.  In doing so, agencies must 
be aware of the limitations of this experiment and plan accordingly for shortfalls in 
the solution itself.  Depending on the desired outcome, agencies could use airborne 
RFID in the same manner as tested in this experiment, or they could link the data 
into new or pre-existing databases for real-time monitoring operations that are 
synchronized with inter-agency or intra-agency information sources.  In addition, 
advances in technology and unmanned vehicles should be peripherally monitored to 
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V. Abbreviated Business Case Analysis 
A. Purpose of Cost Analysis & Summary of Results 
As noted in Chapter II, this paper considers the strengths and weaknesses of 
an Airborne RFID system for use by an agency tasked with small-vessel 
management for the purposes of coastal patrol or protection.  The objective of this 
chapter is to 1) outline the potential stakeholders who may utilize or be affected by 
implementation of an Airborne RFID system, and 2) roughly approximate the costs 
and benefits that the system may have to the stakeholders listed below.  It is not 
within the scope of this chapter to examine the costs of all aspects of an RFID 
system, or alternative technologies that may serve as effective small-vessel 
monitoring systems. Such an endeavor would best be undertaken with a future pilot 
study.  This chapter is intended only as a primer to such a pilot study and to 
complete the analysis of implementation issues.  
In summary, for the notional 300-linear-nautical-mile geographical area 
shown in Figure 17 and described in section D, the total estimated cost to implement 
an Airborne RFID system is $149,164.  This includes the non-recurring cost of 
procuring the interrogation equipment and installing it in all necessary aircraft.  The 
benefits for the first year are estimated to be $601,500.  Figure 18 shows that the 
port/coastal security and the resource-management stakeholders glean the highest 
ratio of benefit-to-cost.  Little if any immediate benefit can be expected for 
agencies—which bear the largest burden of the implementation costs—tasked with 
issuing/maintaining vessel registration and RFID tags.  Figure 19 combines the total 
costs and benefits and displays each stakeholder’s ratio of impact.    
B. Analysis Assumptions 
 Agencies must implement some vessel monitoring system and cannot 
choose inactivity or the status quo.   
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 The equipment costs are based on the current prices found in 
Appendix A of the notional Acquisition Strategy, which is based on the 
commercially available prices found at the time of this writing.    
 Some costs are intangible, and thus are subjectively estimated.  When 
such subjective estimations are used in this report, the data will be 
annotated as to how the estimate was calculated. 
 All estimates are made in FY10 US dollars and are not adjusted or 
discounted for present or future values. 
 The cost of “black box” secure mobile communication connections, 
such as the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) are already in 
development for other purposes and available to agencies with a need 
for secure network transmission from aerial platforms. As a result, the 
cost of integrating RFID network access at this level is considered to 
be a sunk cost and, therefore, negligible for the purposes of this 
chapter. 
 A centralized or regionalized database containing vessel registration 
data is considered to be already existent, and thus, no costing of 
development, implementation, or connections is performed in this cost-
benefit-analysis CBA. 
 RFID-tag batteries are expected to have an operational life of 2 years 
before needing replacement. 
 Agency aircraft are assumed to be preexisting in the inventory, and 
regularly fly mission profiles over the areas of interest.  No new or 
additional missions will be required for Airborne RFID flights.  Existing 
mission profiles, with RFID interrogators on-board, are sufficient for 
vessel monitoring operations. 
C. Potential Stakeholders  
The following is a list of stakeholders who may directly employ or acquire an 
Airborne RFID system, or in some direct way are affected by its implementation.  For 
alternative implementation methods, the potential stakeholder list may change 
significantly.  However, this particular list is premised on the notional implementation 
scenario outlined in section D of this chapter and is intended to orient the reader to 
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1. Agencies Tasked with Providing Port and Coastal Security 
 Description of responsibilities:  
o Responsible for the monitoring of vessel traffic, vessel 
quantities, vessel safety and identifying potentially 
hazardous situations in which vessel traffic exceeds port 
or coastal-authority management abilities. 
o Responsible for monitoring port and coastal areas for 
suspicious or illegal activities performed by vessel 
operators. 
o Responsible for remotely identifying and monitoring 
vessels in areas of interest for coastal and port security 
by increasing the amount and quality of real-time 
information on those vessels, which would help identify 
anomalies that are likely to pose a threat to shore-side or 
floating targets of interest. 
 Connection to the Airborne RFID System: 
o This agency is the primary recipient of the collected RFID 
data, which can be used to execute the responsibilities 
listed above. 
2. Agencies Tasked with Managing Resources 
 Description of responsibilities:  
o Responsible for the protection and management of 
coastal natural resources. Typically, these resources are 
in the form of flora or fauna, or fragile coastal ecosystems 
that require human intervention for safeguarding. 
o Responsible for limiting, restricting, or barring vessel 
traffic or resource use for specific or extended periods of 
time. 
o Responsible for recording measurements of coastal use 
and resource consumption for conservation records and 
trend analysis that contribute to management decisions.  
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o A direct customer of the data collected from the Airborne 
RFID system. 
o Able to utilize the correlation of location and identification 
data collected from recreational vessels to help develop 
effective catch estimations, and contribute to forecasts 
that can aid resource management. 
3. Aviation Units Tasked with Supporting other Stakeholders 
 Description of responsibilities:  
o Directly or indirectly tasked by port & coastal security, 
resource management, or law enforcement personnel 
who require an airborne presence over an area of 
interest for the purpose of interrogating the vessels for 
RFID tag information. 
o Responsible for collecting and disseminating RFID-tag 
interrogation data, which will be generated when the 
airborne asset has been sent into an area of interest. 
o Responsible for maintenance, upkeep, and repair of the 
RFID interrogator system and the various sub-
components that are necessary for data collection. 
o Responsible for the orientation, training, and certification 
of qualified aircrew members who are able to employ and 
troubleshoot the interrogation system onboard the 
aircraft. 
 Connection to the Airborne RFID System: 
o The aviation units represent the interrogation and data 
collection portion of the Airborne RFID system.  The 
aircraft owned by this agency will be outfitted with the 
interrogator module, the antenna, the collection software, 
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4. Agencies Responsible for Law Enforcement 
 Description of responsibilities:  
o Responsible for the safety and protection of the citizens 
who live on and near the coastal area(s). 
o Responsible for the monitoring and enforcement of local, 
state and federal laws. 
o Responsible for coordinating efforts with the coastal 
security and resource management agencies when 
enforcement situations require joint efforts over both land 
and sea. 
o Connection to the Airborne RFID System: 
o Primary users of Airborne RFID system when agency 
aircraft are engaged in patrol, when monitoring activities 
that originate, transect, or conclude in a coastal area of 
interest, and when analyzing trends between any law 
enforcement and vessel registration databases. 
5. Private Vessel Owners 
 Description of responsibilities:  
o Responsible for registering their vessels with the 
appropriate vessel registration agency and complying 
with all vessel owner and water use ordinances and laws. 
o Responsible for following RFID-tag mounting instructions 
given to them by the vessel registration agency and 
ensuring the RFID tag is not blocked or damaged during 
the expected life of the battery. 
o Responsible for replacing the RFID-tag battery that is 
issued to them by the vessel registration agency during 
the periodic re-registration periods.  
 Connection to the Airborne RFID System: 
o The vessel owners represent the RFID-tag user 
population.  The tags, which are affixed to their privately 
owned vessels, may be interrogated by the aviation unit’s 
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6. Agencies Tasked with Issuing/Maintaining Vessel Registration 
and RFID Tags 
 Description of responsibilities:  
o Responsible for maintaining a record of all vessels and 
the owner’s information in databases that can be 
accessed by port security or law-enforcement agencies. 
o Responsible for issuing RFID tags to vessel owners 
when vessels are registered with the agency. 
o Responsible for recording the RFID serial number into 
the agency database, which can be correlated to the 
vessel owner’s information. 
o Responsible for issuing RFID replacement batteries 
when vessel registration renewals are processed, or 
when vessel owners request to purchase additional 
replacement batteries. 
o Responsible for receiving, storing, inventorying, and 
reordering RFID tags to ensure all registered vessels are 
issued one RFID tag. 
 Connection to the Airborne RFID System: 
o This agency acts as the enabler for all current and future 
vessels to receive an RFID tag. 
o This agency links the RFID serial number to the vessel 
registration number. 
D. Notional Implementation Scenario 
The following scenario is a notional coastal area based on the following 
assumptions and key factors.  Figure 17 depicts a hypothetical geographical area 
that may embody many of these elements. 
 The coastline has one major port, one minor port and numerous small 
harbors. 
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 A random distribution of vessels can be found throughout the area of 
concern. 
 A random distribution of vessel types can be found throughout the area 
of concern (e.g., composite, metal and hybrid hulls; commercial and 
private fishing crafts, and recreational crafts). 
 There will be minimal to non-existent overlap with aircraft over-flight. 
This will allow two aircraft to survey 150 linear statute miles each. 
 Within the 300-mile operational area, either the upper or lower limit will 
have contact or overlap with a marine sanctuary under the purview of 
the Resource Manager Stakeholders.  
 An airport is within the operating area that can accommodate the 
aircraft, provide an area for securing the aircraft and allow for the 
Aviation Stakeholders to perform maintenance and have access to 
secure data transmission methods. 
 Law enforcement and/or Security Stakeholders should have a 
minimum of one intercept vessel (size, endurance and support of the 
vessel should be proportional to port size). 
 
 
Figure 17. Hypothetical Geographical Area 
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E. Cost/Benefit Analysis 
The following lists of potential costs and benefits are a rough order of 
magnitude estimates and are expressed, where possible, in FY10 US dollars.  
Agencies are stakeholders, as outlined above, and are within the bounds of the 
notional implementation scenario in Section D above.  One man-year is equal to 
2,000 hours of labor.  A notional cost of $50 per hour is used in all calculations. 
1. Agencies Tasked with Providing Port and Coastal Security 
Costs: $13,000 per year 
 -$13,000 per year, per agency 
o Reason: Labor necessary for periodic aggregation of 
collected RFID data from other stakeholders 
o Basis of estimate:   
 5 hours per week x 52 weeks = 260 man-hours 
 
Benefits: $324,000 per year 
 +$180,000 per year, per agency 
o Reason: Reduction in labor hours required due to 
reduced monitoring and loiter time in areas of interest.  
Labor that typically patrols areas of interest can be 
tasked elsewhere in the agency.  Labor that typically 
covers all 300 nm of the scenario can now be covered by 
two aircraft. 
o Basis of estimate:  
 300 nm broken out into 20-mile patches can be 
monitored by 15 vessel crews 
 Each crew of 2 members spends 5 hours per day 
on patrol 
 2 members x 5 hours per day x 30 days = 300 
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 300 x 12 months = 3,600 hours per year = 
$180,000 
 +$144,000 per year, per agency 
o Reason: Labor hours saved due to reduced monitoring 
and patrol of vessels in the two ports.  Crews can reduce 
the number of patrol cycles by 50% due to better visibility 
from the Airborne RFID platform(s). 
o Basis of estimate:  
 Both harbors are monitored by 1 crew each, with 2 
members per crew 
 Each crew spends 8 hours per day on patrol 
 2 members x 8 hours per day x 30 days = 480 
hours per month 
 480 x 12 months = 5,760 hours per year = 
$288,000 x 50% = $144,000 
2. Agencies Tasked with Managing Resources: 
Costs: $13,000 per year 
 -$13,000 per year, per agency 
o Reason: Labor necessary for periodic aggregation of 
collected RFID data from other stakeholders 
o Basis of estimate:  
 5 hours per week x 52 weeks = 260 man-hours 
Benefits: $273,600 per year 
 +$129,600 per year, per agency 
o Reason: Labor hours necessary for monitoring and 
patrol of vessels in the marine sanctuary can be reduced 
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o Basis of estimate:   
 One vessel with a crew of two members must 
patrol the sanctuary once every day for 4 hours.   
 2 members x 4 hours x 30 days = 240 hours per 
month x 12 months = 2,880 hours per year 
 90% of 2,880 = 2,592 hours = $129,600 
 +$144,000 per year, per agency 
o Reason: Reduction in required number of visual vessel 
inquiries in order to retrieve and record the registration 
number of vessel(s) in the marine sanctuary. 
o Basis of estimate:  
 One crew member with binoculars taking 
approximately 10 minutes per vessel to approach, 
verify, and record the registration number and 
notes on any activities.   
 Estimating 10 vessels per hour, per 8-hour day = 
80 vessels divided by 10 minutes = 8 hours per 
day x 30 days x 12 months = 2,880 hours = 
$144,000 
3. Aviation Units Tasked with Supporting Other Stakeholders 
Costs: $17,650 per year (includes $12,240 non-recurring) 
 -$12,240 one time cost per unit (with 2 aircraft) 
o Reason: Equipment costs and installation for 2 aircraft 
o Basis of estimate: 
 2 interrogators ($2,000 each) = $4,000 
 2 antennas ($70 each) = $140 
 2 laptops ($1,000 each) = $2,000 
 2 software licenses ($2,300 each) = $4,600 
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 -$13,000 per year, per unit 
o Reason: Labor necessary for periodic aggregation of 
collected RFID data and dissemination to other 
stakeholders 
o Basis of estimate:   
 5 hours per week x 52 weeks = 260 man-hours 
 
 -$2,400 per year, per unit 
o Reason: Labor necessary for periodic maintenance and 
repair of the RFID interrogator system.  One major 
maintenance repair procedure per year in which the 
equipment is fully removed and reinstalled. 
o Basis of estimate:   
 3 hours per month x 12 months = 36 man-hours + 
12 hours per year for major maintenance = 36 + 
12 = 48 = $2,400 
 -$2,250 per year, per unit 
o Reason: Labor necessary for initial training and periodic 
refresher training for operators who will utilize the RFID 
interrogator system during patrol flights. 
o Basis of estimate:   
 Initial training: 5 hours per year, per crew member 
(2) + 1 instructor = 3 members x 5 = 15 hours = 
$750 x 2 aircraft = $1,500 
 3 hours per year of refresher training for 4 
members and 1 instructor = 3 hours x 5 members 
= $750 
Benefits: 
o Benefits for the aviation units are likely only intangible 
and incalculable.  One remote possibility is for security 
agencies that benefit from Airborne RFID to increase 
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4. Agencies Responsible for Law Enforcement 
Costs: $13,000 per year 
 -$13,000 per year, per agency 
o Reason: Labor necessary for periodic aggregation of 
collected RFID data from other stakeholders 
o Basis of estimate:  
 5 hours per week x 52 weeks = 260 man-hours 
Benefits: $3,900 per year 
 +$3,900 per year, per agency 
o Reason: Reduction in labor hours required due to 
reduced monitoring and patrol time in areas of interest.  
Labor that typically patrols areas of interest and responds 
to situations in which enforcement is needed can be 
tasked elsewhere in the agency.  Time and labor 
expended coordinating with other agencies about vessel 
registration data can be reduced if the law-enforcement 
agency has access to the latest Airborne RFID readings. 
o Basis of estimate:   
 Estimating two false-alarm situations per week 
that could have been avoided if Airborne RFID 
records were consulted first (finding that a vessel 
is actually still in port, for example). 
 Each false-alarm response requires 45 minutes of 
action and post-action paperwork. 
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5. Private Vessel Owners 
Costs: $64 per year 
 -$64 per year, per vessel owner 
o Reason: In addition to the cost of vessel registration or 
renewal, owners must purchase the RFID tag and a new 
battery every two years. 
o Basis of estimate:   
 Initial cost of tag (average market value) = $61 
(high price of $77 and low price of $45) 
 Annual cost of battery replacement = $4 ($8 
battery purchased every two years) 
Benefits: 
o Benefits to the private vessel owners are likely only 
intangible and incalculable.  One remote possibility is that 
security agencies that benefit from Airborne RFID may be 
able to decrease vessel registration and fishing license 
fees due to patrol-mission cost reductions. 
6. Agencies Tasked with Issuing/Maintaining Vessel Registration 
and RFID Tags 
Costs: $80,210 per year 
 -$13,000 per year, per agency 
o Reason: RFID tags must be managed, stored, issued, 
and restocked. 
o Basis of estimate:   
 5 hours of labor per week to manage inventory, 
receive new tags, and properly dispose of expired 
batteries. 
– 5 hours per week x 52 weeks = 260 man-
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 -$54,210 per year, per agency 
o Reason: Ten minutes extra time is required per vessel 
registration to pull a tag from inventory, enter the number 
into the registration database, and instruct the vessel 
owner on how to properly install the tag. 
o Basis of estimate:   
 Assuming 25 vessel registration or renewals per 
day, 25 x 10 minutes = 250 additional minutes per 
day, or 4.17 hours per day 
– 4.17 hours x 5 days per week x 52 weeks = 
1,084.2 hours 
 -$13,000 per year, per agency 
o Reason: Labor necessary for periodic dissemination of 
vessel registration and RFID-tag data to other 
stakeholders or law-enforcement databases 
o Basis of estimate:   
 5 hours per week x 52 weeks = 260 man-hours 
per year 
Benefits: 
o Benefits to the registration agency are likely non-existent.  
RFID-tag issuance, if accomplished by this type of 
agency, would only add additional duties and 
responsibilities.  Agencies that benefit from Airborne 
RFID should consider attempting to offset additional labor 
costs levied on this agency. 
F. Cost/Benefit Summary 
From a combined agency and stakeholder perspective, an estimated positive 
benefit of $452,336 for the first year is the predicted outcome.  This amount 
overshadows the initial investment costs and builds a strong case towards the 
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A summary of the estimated costs and benefits are displayed in Table 3.  The 
resultant ratios are graphically displayed in Figures 18 and 19. 
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Figure 19. Cost & Benefit Distribution by Stakeholder 
Under the circumstances outlined in this abbreviated cost/benefit analysis, 
implementation of an Airborne RFID system merits further examination by agencies 
that may perform similar responsibilities as those listed in the stakeholder list in 
Section C of this chapter.  In future studies, plans must be made to ensure that the 
various stakeholders understand their roles and responsibilities and the impacts 
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Appendix A. Notional Acquisition Strategy 
A. Concept of Operations & Equipment Use 
1. General Overview  
Appendix A outlines a plan for rapid procurement of commercially available 
RFID technology by a US Government agency for the purpose of monitoring moving 
vehicles from airborne platforms.  Leveraging the results from the successful 
feasibility study outlined in previous chapters, the authors feel that a complete 
research and development strategy is not necessary to get this capability fielded in 
short order.  Thus, this strategy will only examine the facets needed for procurement 
and implementation of commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) technology and any minimal 
airframe integration measures.  This appendix will not stand alone as a procurement 
guide, but instead, it will serve as a strategy guidebook for program-office officials 
using the Department of Defense Instruction 5000.02 principles (USD(AT&L), 2008).   
Starting with an examination of a potential concept of operation for an 
airborne RFID system, this guide will examine equipment standards to replicate the 
results of this experiment and the programmatic steps necessary to procure, field, 
and maintain the equipment.  The solution proposed is only for the RFID equipment 
and any integration engineering required for installation onto existing airborne 
platforms. 
2. Potential Concept of Operations (CONOPS) 
There could be numerous methods and arrangements made by organizations 
to procure and utilize an Airborne RFID system.  This particular concept of 
operations seeks to suggest one possible method, though acquiring agencies may 
have unique and better methods suited for their particular needs.  Within this 
particular guide, COTS equipment procured for this Airborne RFID system will be 
divided and annotated generally into three categories: 1) interrogation equipment, 2) 
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be referred to as readers, tags, and data processors.  Also, the combined 
components will be referred to as the Airborne RFID system. 
After procurement, readers and data processors could be sent to the gaining 
agency’s aviation units, where they will be affixed to existing aircraft in the inventory.  
They will be added to the unit’s inventory list, and ownership will be transferred to 
the resource managers.  Tags will be sent to an issuing agency for dispersal with 
existing vessel registration procedures.  Tags will remain the property of the 
procuring agency, thus a data-sharing agreement will be required to ensure the 
procuring agency and the aviation units are aware of the locations of all tags issued 
to the public. 
The aviation units will incorporate the readers into their existing flight 
operations and missions, allowing the RFID technology to be run either as primary or 
secondary mission tasks.  During flights, tag data will automatically be recorded by 
the readers if the aircraft is flown into the proximity requirement of the RFID 
technology.  The aviation units will be required to transfer the reader data to the data 
processors upon completion of the mission and to maintain the readers according to 
technical order specifications supplied by the procuring agency. 
3. General Equipment Requirements 
The reader used in the feasibility experiment was a Savi Technologies SP-
652-111 module designed to operate in the 433.92 MHz range, using a standard 
directional 9 dBi Yagi antenna and a 12-volt, direct-current power supply.  The 
reader weighed approximately 2 lbs and the antenna and cabling collectively 
weighed approximately six lbs.  The reader and antenna units are built to comply 
with FCC signal requirements. 
The tags used were Savi Technology ST-654 active RFID tags developed for 
the US Navy and operated at 433.92 MHz.  Savi’s EPtool software was used to 
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system.  EPtool is not for sale to the public, but Savi does offer similar products that 
perform similarly to EPtool. 
To replicate a system like the one tested in this feasibility study, Table 4 
outlines the suggested threshold and objective values.  Threshold values summarize 
the equipment used in the feasibility test.  Objective values must be tailored to 
specificorganizations and any unique requirements they may have.  Note that DoDI 
5000.01 requires each successive increment of procurement to have its own set of 
threshold and objective values (USD(AT&L), 2008, p. 13). 
Table 4. Airborne RFID Threshold/Objective List 
 Threshold Objective 
Reader Size & Weight 2-3 lbs Airframe Specific 
Reader Frequency 433.92 MHz 433.92 MHz and other RFID 
tag frequencies that may 
potentially be used 
Reader Environmental 
Limitations 
Temperature: -32°C to +70°C  
Humidity: 100% 
Vibration & Shock: MIL-STS-810E 
Method 15.4, Category 10 
Vessel or Organization 
Specific  
Tag Size & Weight Size: 6.25” x 2.125” x 1.125” 
Wt: 3.8 ounces 
Vessel or Organization 
Specific 
Tag Frequency and Power 
Output 
433.92 MHz at 0.6 mW 
 
Organization Specific 
Tag Battery Life 10 Sec Beacon Mode: 1 Year 
Pole Mode: 3 Years 
10 Sec Beacon Mode: 2 
Years 
Pole Mode: 5 Years 
Tag Beaconing Frequency 10 seconds to replicate experiment <10 seconds for more 
readings per aircraft pass 
Tag Environmental 
Limitations 
Vibration & Shock: MIL-STD-810E, 
method 15.4, Category 10 
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4. Communication of Limitations of Airborne RFID Solution 
Procuring organizations should explain clearly to requirement agencies that 
the Airborne RFID system studied in our experiment has many limitations and 
cannot serve as a standalone system for complete monitoring, tracking or 
surveillance of vessels.  Chapter IV of this project outlines the results and observed 
identification ranges of the system.  These limitations are expected to diminish over 
the next decade as RFID technology improves with increased use by industry and 
government. 
5. Modular Open Systems Architecture (MOSA) 
Program managers, “shall employ MOSA to design for affordable change, 
enable evolutionary acquisition, and rapidly field affordable systems” (USD(AT&L), 
2008, p. 79).  The proposed Airborne RFID system and the ever-evolving pool of 
COTS RFID technologies are best procured using a MOSA methodology in 
government acquisition processes.   Early determination by the procuring agency 
that the Airborne RFID system will be only a portion of a large data-gathering 
network—and not a one-unit/one-manufacturer system—will ensure that future RFID 
technologies can be leveraged quickly, without interruption to on-going data-
gathering missions.  A complete explanation and implementation guide for MOSA 
can be found in the DoD guidebook, A Modular Open Systems Approach (MOSA) to 
Acquisitions (OSD, 2004). 
The Airborne RFID system can be procured under MOSA rules, if the 
procuring agency avoids RFID manufacturers who build proprietary reader/tag 
interfaces.  If proprietary RFID tags are issued en masse, then the procuring agency 
must recall and reissue these tags if they wish to upgrade later to a different 
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B. Suggested Program Office Structure 
1. Program Office Organization 
Procurement of this Airborne RFID system will not require the establishment 
of a new Program Management Office (PMO).  Because the technology for this 
system is commercially available and involved Research & Development (R&D) will 
not be required, procurement and management work levels will have minimal impact 
on an existing PMO.  Management of Airborne RFID procurement activities would 
best align with existing electronics, communications, or information technology 
PMO’s that have at least one Acquisition Category Level Three (ACAT-III) program 
already underway.  Depending on the workload of the PMO, this system could be 
managed by one of each of the following properly trained acquisition personnel:  
 Program Manager—Defense Acquisition Improvement Act (DAIWA) 
Program Manager Level 2 or higher certification 
 Systems Engineer—DAIWA Systems Planning, Research, 
Development  and Engineering  Level 1 or higher certification 
 Lifecycle Logistics Engineer—DAIWA Lifecycle Logistics Level 1 or 
higher certification 
The above personnel must have periodic access to financial, contracting, and 
legal representatives in the PMO for contract and financial administration services.   
2. Funding & ACAT Designation 
The equipment used in the feasibility test (see Chapter III) has an estimated 
commercial value of $5,986.  This price includes one of each of the first four items in 
Table 5 and eight tags.  Because the quantity of tags will vary with the desired 
population that the agency wants to track, the price of the tags has been omitted 
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Table 5. Cost of RFID Equipment Used in Experiment 
Item Estimated Cost Per Item (FY09 Dollars) 
Reader Module & Cables $2,000 
Reader Antenna $70 
Data Processing Software License $2,300 
Laptop with Microsoft Windows XP or Vista $1,000 
RFID Active Tags (Eight used @ $77 each) $616 
Total $5,986 
 
Assuming that a notional agency will procure forty units55 for the coast lines of 
the continental United States, the total initial procurement cost will be approximately 
$214,800 (FY09 dollars).56  Table 6 outlines the price of ten units for each region’s 
acquisition.  Of course, this does not include the price of tags, which would vary 
depending on the agency’s concept of operations and how many vessels they would 
plan to monitor. 
Table 6. Estimated Regional Cost to Procure Ten Units (not including tags) 
Quantity per 
Region 
Item Estimated Cost Per Region (FY09 
Dollars) 
10 Reader Modules & Cables $20,000 
10 Reader Antennas $700 
10 Data Processing Software License $23,000 
10 Laptop with Microsoft Windows XP or Vista $10,000 
 Total per Region $53,700 
 
DoDI 5000.02 designates Acquisition Categories (ACATs) according to total 
Research, Development, Test & Evaluation (RDT&E) estimates, (USD(AT&L), 2008, 
                                            
55 This is based on dividing the United States into four regions and assigning 10 systems per region 
for coastal use only.  The notional regions would be A) Northwest Coast & Alaska, B) Southwest 
Coast & Hawaii, C) Northeast Coast down through Virginia, and D) Southeast Coast from North 
Carolina down to the Gulf of Mexico. 
56 This cost is only a rough estimate and is only shown here to inform the reader that this project is in 
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p. 33).  Thus, if the agency desires to start a new program for Airborne RFID, it 
would qualify as an ACAT-III.  Additionally, this system would not qualify as a Major 
Defense Acquisition Program or Major Automated Information System and would be 
exempt from the extra oversight and report generation required with those 
designations. 
An alternative to seeking ACAT status would be to locate an existing program 
with congressional approval that is generic enough to procure data collection or 
tracking systems.  Under such blanket approval, and using a MOSA approach, an 
office would not have to wait to receive an ACAT designation. 
C. Product Lifecycle and Evolutionary Acquisition 
DoDI 5000.02 states that the evolutionary acquisition approach is the 
“preferred DoD strategy for rapid acquisition of mature technology” (USD(AT&L), 
2008, p. 13).  Figure 20 outlines this process, which allows rapid delivery of 
capabilities in increments.  Though the technology for an Airborne RFID system is 
COTS available, following the evolutionary acquisition approach would ensure 
important aspects of the product lifecycle are considered and managed.  
 
Figure 20. Requirements and Acquisition Process Flow  
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This report will concentrate on the core programmatic functions outlined in 
Figure 20 and the DoDI 5000.02.  Requirements functions, labeled with names like 
Guidance, Concepts, CDD, and/or CPD, are functions of the user community and 
are thus only peripherally discussed.  This report assumes the user community has 
deemed the Airborne RFID system to be worth procuring and has therefore 
completed the required processes to obtain authorization and appropriation through 
the Planning, Programming, Budgeting & Execution System (PPBES) of the DoD.  
Note also that Figure 20 does not depict the production, deployment, and operations 
of each increment, which occur after the Milestone C triangles. 
1. Materiel Solution Analysis Phase 
This first phase is mandatory for all programs and is the formal entry point 
into the acquisition process.  It is designed to examine the various materiel solutions 
in the market and, thus, will augment the formal Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) study 
performed by the requirement owners.  A major goal of this Airborne RFID feasibility 
study is to accelerate this phase and the generation of the AoA.  Having a completed 
research report and associated price estimate with performance statistics should 
eliminate much of the time ordinarily needed for this type of analysis.  The exit 
criteria for this  phase are a “complete[ed] AoA, a proposed materiel solution, and 
full funding for the next phase” (USD(AT&L), 2008, p. 16), which will be required for 
the Milestone A review. 
2. Technology Development Phase 
For a typical acquisition program in which R&D is required, this phase is used 
to bring the concept into a prototype form.  Building from the Milestone A approved 
material solution, funds would be spent to form drawings from ideas and forms from 
drawings.   
For Airborne RFID, this phase has also been substantially shortened due to 
this feasibility study.  DoDI 5000.02 states that technology “procured from industry or 
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in an operation environment to be considered mature enough to used for product 
development” (USD(AT&L), 2008, p. 19).  Chapter III of this project outlines the test 
environment in which the Airborne RFID system was studied.  With aircraft 
airspeeds equivalent to most airborne assets and weather conditions on the ocean 
consistent with typical coastal days, we argue that the test represents an operational 
environment.  If the user representatives in the PMO agree with this assessment, 
then the 5000.02 regulations allow program advancement to the Milestone B review. 
A more conservative approach would be to conduct market research 
according to Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Part 10 and 12.202 to solicit 
companies to report on any similar relevant/operational demonstrations with RFID 
and airborne assets.  We were unable to find any firms that had performed this type 
of research.  
3. Engineering and Manufacturing Development Phase 
This feasibility experiment was performed with a DeHavilland DHC-6 Twin 
Otter turboprop airframe operated by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA).  Details of the equipment installation, antenna orientation, 
and flight profiles can be found in Chapter III.  If the acquiring agency desires to 
equip their existing DHC-6’s, then this study may slightly accelerate the Engineering 
& Manufacturing Development phase.  For procuring agencies that will use other 
airframe types, this phase will require a higher level of effort than previous phases. 
The purpose of this phase is to develop a complete, full system article upon 
which supportability, usability, and affordability tests can be conducted.  Full 
program funding is required because contracts will be issued to a company after a 
source selection is complete.  Beyond the typical information supplied in 
solicitations, a list of recommended additional considerations when writing the 
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 Outline or provide specifications for interface with the specific airframe 
that the Airborne RFID system will be installed on,57 
 Request airframe-specific mounting methods for the RFID antenna, 
 Request airframe-specific antenna options—internal or external and 
price/performance trade-offs, 
 Request airframe-specific flight profiles for the best interrogation 
conditions, 
 Request RFID system shielding techniques and subsequent navigation 
and instrumentation interference levels, 
 Request center-of-gravity correction calculations to account for weight, 
 Request expected aircraft performance impact(s), if equipment will be 
mounted in the airstream, 
 Request Federal Communications Commission equipment certification, 
 Request data anti-tamper cost plan (if platform to be used in combat), 
 Request a complete aircrew and vessel occupant PESHE 
(Programmatic Environment, Safety and Occupational Health) report, 
 Request an Environmental Impact Assessment—if not covered in the 
standard PESHE report, 
 Request a feasibility report for compliance with the Information 
Assurance & Privacy Act, and 
 Request a Systems Engineering Management Plan. 
a. Contract Competition & Type  
FAR Part 6.102 mandates the use of competitive procedures in the pursuit of 
a commercial contract (GSA, 2005).   Two competitive methods could be used for 
the Airborne RFID system: sealed bid or best value.  For the initial procurement of 
                                            
57 Depending on the level of integration and/or interference between the Airborne RFID system and 
the airframe, the PMO or depot responsible for the airframe may become a prominent stakeholder.  
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the Airborne RFID system, we do not recommend sealed bidding due to the 
unknowns in the specific airframe that the system will integrate with.  World Class 
Contracting states that, “to use sealed bidding, the buyer must have a specification 
that clearly and definitively describes the required product or service” (Garrett, 
2007).  Full and open completion will ensure the best technologies are presented to 
the acquiring agency.  After the initial procurement of the system, and after 
successful fielding and implementation, subsequent procurements could be 
accomplished via the sealed bid approach for rapid resupply or expansion of the 
system footprint. 
Best value procurement, as outlined in FAR 15.101, can be accomplished by 
open communication forums with industry, as outlined in FAR 15.201.  “Exchanges 
of information among all interested parties, from the earliest identification of a 
requirement through receipt of proposals, are encouraged” (GSA, 2005, p. 343).  We 
recommend hosting detailed discussions with RFID industry about this feasibility 
experiment and findings.  Industry representatives will gain better understanding of 
the objective, limitations, and potential when presented with actual findings. 
The uncertainties in dealing with the procuring agency’s unique airframe type 
are likely the only risk associated with using a firm fixed-price (FFP) contract.  An 
FFP contract, as outlined in FAR 16.202, would ensure the suppliers quote the 
current (and often publicly known) COTS price for their RFID equipment.  The 
acquiring agency could ask for proposal returns in weeks, rather than a month or 
more, which would accelerate the overall procurement timeline.  Furthermore, 
according to FAR Part 12 for the acquisition of commercial items, “agencies shall 
use firm-fixed-price or fixed-price contracts with economic price adjustment” (GSA, 
2005, p. 279).  For the additional non-materiel items outlined above, the procuring 
agency could request flat-rate engineering man-hours to produce the information 
reports.  Together, the cost of the RFID equipment and the man-hour requirements 
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A secondary option would be to pursue a fixed-price-incentive (FPI) contract.  
As outlined in FAR 16.204 and 16.401, the FPI can be written in a way that will 
establish a cost ceiling, but still allow room for cost growth if integration problems 
arise with the aircraft systems.  Contractors can be incentivized by either speeding 
up delivery or producing solutions that out-perform the technical requirements.  
Depending on the type of aircraft the Airborne RFID system will be mounted on, and 
using the system price data outlined in this strategy, a fairly accurate target price can 
be calculated by the procuring agency, allowing little room for subsequent cost 
overruns during contract execution. 
An FPI contract may have the disadvantage of being more paperwork-
intensive and, thus, slower to process, but it may also have an advantage over the 
FFP if the agency’s particular aircraft needs substantial levels of examination to 
integrate with the Airborne RFID system.  After the contract type is chosen, the 
procuring office can use the sample Statement of Work (SOW) provided in Appendix 
B. 
b. Post Solicitation 
Jumping ahead to the point at which a contractor has been awarded the 
contract and is working on the solution, the procuring agency must be ready to 
supply any additional information about the specific airframe to the contractor 
engineers.  The procuring agency should keep in mind that the technology does not 
have to be developed since the RFP specifically stated that current non-
developmental items were required.  With this understanding, it would not be unfair 
to ask for a product demonstration within a few weeks of contract award and to 
press the contractor for Preliminary Design Review (PDR) soon afterwards. 
After the contractor has had access to the airframe and any airframe-related 
documents, the procuring agency should support any developmental test and 
evaluation measures necessary to prove the successful integration of the systems.  
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technical progress, determine affordability results and lifecycle cost estimates, and 
ensure that the performance findings are well within the objective and threshold 
limits.   
4. Production & Deployment Phase 
This phase begins the mass production of the solution developed in the 
previous development stage.  Initial low quantities will be delivered to the procuring 
agency for testing on the actual airframe, if not already accomplished.  Depending 
on the perceived level of complexity for the interface(s) between the RFID 
equipment and the airframe, the procuring agency can enter either a Low-rate Initial 
Procurement (LRIP) phase for an extended amount of time or a Full-rate Production 
(FRP) phase, if initial LRIP items perform well in the fielded applications. 
Production and deployment of the RFID tags are outside the scope of this 
appendix.  However, the procuring agency must determine procedures for the 
acceptance of the RFID tags from the manufacturer.  Once the tags become the 
property of the procuring agency and any warranties from the manufacturer are 
initiated, the procuring agency must have a plan in place to distribute the tags to the 
issuing agencies.  Procuring the Airborne RFID system without a plan in place to 
distribute the tags is a waste of time and money since each component relies upon 
the other in order to function. 
5. Operations & Support Phase 
This final phase covers the utilization, support, maintenance, modernization, 
and disposal of the Airborne RFID system.  Much about the exact requirements and 
activities in this phase is speculative; accordingly, we desire to point out only a few 
non-standard items that may be unique to the Airborne RFID system. 
At the time of this feasibility study, the passive RFID tags (having no self-
contained batteries) had a limited range of less than 100 feet. For obvious reasons, 
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source and have been shown in this project to have ranges in the 3,000- to 5,000-
foot range.  The disadvantage with active tags is the price—the tags were $77 each, 
and typical passive tags can be priced as low as $0.20.  As part of the Operations 
and Support phase, we recommend a periodic examination of the RFID market to 
see if technology maturation improves the passive tag’s performance to a point at 
which they become viable options to the active-tag market. 
Secondly, we recommend a constant examination of the operational 
environment to see if the Airborne RFID system could be interlaced with other 
information-gathering or disseminating programs or procedures.  The output from 
the Airborne RFID system is a real-time snapshot of assets and their general 
location.  Over time, each datum represents a piece of a puzzle that could be 
incorporated into behavior-mapping software programs or prediction analysis 
systems.  For any program that requires such data, the Airborne RFID system 
should be introduced as a viable and fielded solution to minimize R&D costs for any 
new program. 
Finally, for the foreseeable future, the active RFID tags require an internal 
battery for operation.  Currently, these batteries have a shelf life of about ten years 
and an operational life of three years.  To keep the Airborne RFID system 
operational, plans must be made and executed to replace the batteries before they 
reach the end of their designed life.  In addition, the batteries must be disposed of in 
accordance to the environmental laws that govern the materials used in the 
batteries.  The PESHE plan delivered by the contractor will outline many, if not all, of 
the avenues for proper disposal. 
D. Summary 
This strategy has been written as a start-up guide for a procuring agency that 
has been tasked with the procurement and initial implementation of an Airborne 
RFID system, similar to the one used in this feasibility experiment.  Specifications of 
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regulations to form a high-level manual for interested agencies.  It must be noted 
that this guide cannot and must not replace official DoD and agency regulations and 
policies for acquisition and procurement. 
Though many regulations and rules govern the procedures behind the 
procurement of an acquisition item, no one program can be acquired in exactly the 
same way that another program was acquired.  Flexibility and creativity is often 
required to ensure the procuring agency receives the item(s) that it needs within the 
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Appendix B. Sample Acquisition Statement of 
Work (SOW) 
The contractor shall assemble an RFID system, consisting of pre-developed 
and tested items, for the purpose of use onboard a government aircraft.  The RFID 
equipment must meet or exceed the size, weight, and performance specifications 
outlined in the equipment objective/threshold characteristics list found below.  If 
these criteria cannot be met, please provide the procuring agency with rationale as 
to the reason.  The equipment must not be developed specifically for this application, 
but must have been previously developed for use in other systems or applications 
and preferably have been qualified for industrial or military use. 
The contractor shall examine airframe data provided by the procuring agency 
in order to propose a least-intrusive method for installing the RFID equipment and 
antenna onto the aircraft.  Every opportunity must be taken by the contractor to 
minimize aircraft modification.  Contractors who propose internally mounted 
antennas or the utilization of pre-existing aircraft antennas will receive higher 
consideration in the source-selection stage. 
The contractor shall support a Preliminary Design Review and cursory 
equipment demonstration before the beginning of the fourth week after contract 
award.  This accelerated timeline is requested in order to expedite the procurement 
process.  Further, the contractor shall support a Critical Design Review four weeks 
after the completion of the airframe orientation, which will be set up by the procuring 
agency. 
The contractor shall supply the procuring agency with detailed test and 
evaluation data of the proposed Airborne RFID system and will provide two systems, 
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In addition to the above deliverables, the contractor shall provide the 
following: 
 An outline or specification for interface with the specific airframe on 
which the Airborne RFID system will be installed, 
 Proposed airframe-specific mounting methods for the RFID antenna, 
 Proposed airframe-specific antenna options—internal or external—and 
price/performance trade-offs, 
 Proposed airframe-specific flight profiles for the best interrogation 
conditions, 
 Proposed RFID system and aircraft electronic shielding techniques and 
subsequent navigation and instrumentation interference levels, 
 Center-of-gravity correction calculations to account for additional 
weight, 
 Expected aircraft performance impact(s) if equipment will be mounted 
in the airstream, 
 Federal Communications Commission equipment certification of RFID 
equipment, 
 An anti-tamper cost plan for data protection (if platform is to be used in 
combat zone), 
 A complete aircrew and vessel occupant PESHE (Programmatic 
Environment, Safety and Occupational Health) report, 
 An Environmental Impact Assessment—if not covered in the standard 
PESHE report, 
 A feasibility report ensuring compliance with the Information Assurance 
& Privacy Act, and 
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Table 7. Equipment Objective/Threshold Characteristics List for SOW 
 Threshold Objective 
Reader Size & Weight 2-3 lbs Airframe Specific 
Reader Frequency 433.92 MHz 433.92 MHz and other RFID 
tag frequencies that may 
potentially be used 
Reader Environmental 
Limitations 
Temperature: -32°C to +70°C  
Humidity: 100% 
Vibration & Shock: MIL-STS-810E 
Method 15.4, Category 10 
Vessel or Organization 
Specific  
Tag Size & Weight Size: 6.25” x 2.125” x 1.125” 
Wt: 3.8 ounces 
Vessel or Organization 
Specific 
Tag Frequency and Power 
Output 
433.92 MHz at 0.6 mW 
 
Organization Specific 
Tag Battery Life 10 Sec Beacon Mode: 1 Year 
Pole Mode: 3 Years 
10 Sec Beacon Mode: 2 
Years 
Pole Mode: 5 Years 
Tag Beaconing Frequency 10 seconds to replicate experiment <10 seconds for more 
readings per aircraft pass 
Tag Environmental 
Limitations 
Vibration & Shock: MIL-STD-810E, 
method 15.4, Category 10 
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Appendix C.  Change Theory Applied to Fisheries 
Of the stakeholders outlined in Chapter VI, the resource managers operate in 
perhaps the most complex environment with regard to implementation of a systemic 
change such as RFID monitoring of vessels. This appendix employs modern change 
theory to consider some of the issues related to RFID implementation in the 
resource-management environment.  
A. New Regime 
The new regime would be the implementation of RFID to supplement the 
Marine Recreational Fisheries Statistics Survey (MRFSS). This technology would be 
a complete shift from the way “business” is currently being conducted with respect to 
recreational fishers. There is currently very little oversight in the recreational fisher’s 
community, with the exception of modest federal mandates and internal concepts 
(e.g., “no-take fishing”), and, as noted in Chapter II, the current MRFSS is 
inadequate in providing sufficient information to enable sound management 
decisions.  By implementing RFID monitoring, better information would be brought to 
bear as a tool for resource managers to augment the data that is captured within the 
Marine Recreational Fisheries Statistical Survey.  
Implementing RFID monitoring would also incorporate resource management 
into a developing infrastructure within the Federal Government58 that would include a 
DMV-style registration system, on-site inspectors and enforcement personnel who 
would interface with the public.  
One challenge arising from this would be the need to persuade recreational 
fishers that this move would have a positive impact on not only their sport but also 
on the overall health of the ecosystem.  
                                            
58 As an integrated network which would include the Department of Homeland Security and the 
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B. Explanatory Model for Resource Management 
 
Figure 21. A Combination of Leavitt’s Model with Weisbord’s  
External Environment 
1. Structure 
The overall structure of marine fisheries management closely resembles a 
machine bureaucracy, though there are some ad hoc components within it. The 
primary agency that institutes policy among the marine fisheries within the United 
States is the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), which 
pushes the mandates and a majority of the enforcement responsibilities down to the 
lowest levels through state governments and their respective fish-and-game 
departments. Some state and local governments also institute policies that are more 
stringent than federal policies.  Since the NOAA is a federal agency, there is a high 
degree of “publicness” that drives many of the policies set forth. That is, there are 
many stakeholders within and outside the government that wish to have their own 
agendas expressed through this agency and its policies.  
If a problem were to arise for a given location, ecosystem, or species, the 
NOAA would institute measures to safeguard the resource. For instance, for the 
2008 salmon fishing season, it was determined that the figures for the species 
abundance were below acceptable levels. Therefore, the NOAA closed salmon 





do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 105 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
2. Technology 
The NOAA, through its various assets, is able to employ a multitude of 
advanced scientific methods, equipment, and resources to better manage the 
fisheries within the United States. However, most of the strategies employed are 
reactive. In other words, data will show that a particular resource has been overused 
in retrospect, and the resultant action that must be taken is more severe than if 
forecasting had been more prescient. There are very few assets deployed that 
provide data enabling the NOAA to be proactive, e.g., the NOAA’s Tsunami DART® 
(Deep-Ocean Assessment and Reporting of Tsunami) buoys, which provide real-
time information on benthic seismic activity. Currently, there is a movement within 
the Federal Government to institute a federal fishing-license database and a real-
time small-vessel tracking (monitoring) system.59 In short, several agencies within 
the Federal Government are asking that current and future technologies be 
developed and fielded to provide a substantial forecasting advantage to their 
required tasks.  
3. People (Stakeholders) 
Resistance to any form of monitoring is expected. Individuals or groups that 
desire not to have this technology would view this implementation as a potential 
invasion of privacy, an imposition or means to further gain tax dollars. Conversely, 
those who desire this technology may see this as a positive step forward, but not 
enough of a step forward. They may champion this technology and may expect more 
than can be offered by it. Or, they may simply desire to have this technology as a 
tool for resource management.
                                            
59 The small-vessel tracking system that has been proposed can act much like the Vessel Traffic 
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Stakeholders: 
 Federal Government 
o Department of Commerce (DOC) 
 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
– Tasked with resource management and policy 
o Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
 United States Coast Guard 
– Tasked with port security and enforcement within 
marine sanctuaries 
o Department of Defense (DoD) 
 United States Navy 
– Tasked with port security and concerns over 
vessel traffic around sensitive assets 
 State Governments 
 Concerned with tax revenue and constituents’ rights  
o Department of Fish and Wildlife (Game) 
 Tasked with endemic resource management and 
enforcement 
 Local Governments 
 Concerned with local tax revenue and constituents’ rights 
o Harbor Patrols and Sheriffs  
 Concerned with local vessel traffic and law enforcement 
 Tribal Governments 
o Subsistence Fishers 
 Concerned that tribal rights and customs are honored 
and followed  
 Environmentalist Groups 
o Concerned with health of the earth 
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 Coast Watch 
 Earth Liberation Front 
 Earthwatch 
 Conservation Foundation 
 North American Native Fishes Association 
 Cal Ocean 
 Aquariums 
 Colleges and Universities 
 Et cetera 
 Recreational Fishers 
 Concerned about potential over-regulation 
 Concerned with privacy issues  
 Concerned that stewardship is being mishandled by the 
government 
 Concerned with increasing taxes in volatile economy 
 Resources 
 Concerned with own population, recruitment and 
fecundity 
 Concerned with invasive species 
 Concerned with predator/prey cycles, i.e., trophic  levels 
 RFID Manufacturers 
 Have viable stake in market 
4. Task 
The desired task is to implement a Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) 
program so that resource managers would have the ability to collect and analyze 
data for abundance and health management; security personnel would have the 
ability to inquire and interrogate vessel location and/or status in an unobtrusive 
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much “buy-in” from as many of the stakeholders as possible because without 
support at the lowest levels, any well-intentioned program cannot succeed on its 
own merit.  
5. External Environment 
Burke states, “An organization’s history is also [an] input into the system” 
(Burke, 2008). This is an important concept to articulate in this particular instance. 
Resource management has long been a controversial subject that has had a 
tumultuous relationship with the general public. Prior to the establishment of 
resource-management statutes, it was often the individual(s) utilizing the resource 
that acted as steward(s) of the resource—an example of the public caring for the 
commons. However, as populations began to expand, the commons were at risk for 
over-exploitation to satisfy singular or multiple uses, e.g., over-fishing a certain 
species to satisfy current market demand. As a result, the Federal Government 
stepped in and began regulating resource consumption. This was met with both 
disdain and hope.  
The hope was that the Federal Government would be able act in the best 
interest of all. However, as many have pointed out, the Federal Government’s 
agenda is constantly changing as successive administrations influence policy. Thus, 
resource management has become an amalgamation of the goals of several 
different administrations and has been seen by some members of the public as a 
puppet of corrupt politicians. As an example, former Alaska Senator Ted Stevens 
was an instrumental force in creating and passing one of the most effective pieces of 
marine-resource legislation, the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and 
Management Act. However, he was later denigrated, and subsequently lost his 
Senate seat, for his alleged role in several corruption scandals, including the 
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Ultimately, all sides of the marine-resource issue can find fault in either too 
much, not enough, or ineffective regulation and call selective opinions into question 
when it suits their respective need.   
C. Plan for Implementation 
The primary model that would be used for implementation would be Lippitt’s 
Phase of Planned Change and how the ideas of unfreezing, establishing a change 
agent, moving, refreezing and termination can demonstrate RFID technology as a 
tool that can benefit everyone (Warner, 2008, p.144). Lippitt’s model, coupled with 
Vroom and Lawler’s Expectancy Theory (Miner, 2005, p. 96), provide a good 
resource to create a baseline for proposed change within the NOAA’s methodology.  
1. Phases of Planned Change 
a. Unfreezing 
The NOAA has been made aware that there are flaws within their data, data 
collection, and data analysis that have a direct impact on marine resource 
management. The National Research Council (NRC) was commissioned by the 
NOAA to conduct an in-depth analysis on its Marine Recreational Fishery Statistics 
Survey (MRFSS). The NRC published its findings not in a paper, but in a book. The 
NRC illustrated in its book that a key component in the MRFSS is flawed: the 
concept that recreational fishers are only taking a trivial amount from the ocean and 
need not be concerned when conducting diversity and abundance studies. 
Some estimates put the total take of some species up to 80% by recreational 
fishers and 20% by the commercial industry (NRC, 2006). While it can be argued 
that commercial fishers appear to take large hauls relative to the average weekend 
fisher, the cumulative effect that the recreational fishers are having is more profound 
(King, 1995). Thus, the NOAA has come to the realization that they need to capture 
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supplement or completely reorganize the Marine Recreational Fishery Statistic 
Survey.  
b. Establishing a Change Agent 
Establishing a change agent for this proposed change would be the most 
important step. By looking at the various stakeholders, one can see that these 
groups are extremely passionate on both the pro and con sides of the argument. 
The individual or group that would proffer the change would need to understand the 
various regional issues that are specific to each group of stakeholders. For example: 
 Fishermen are going to know which species they want to catch; 
 Environmentalists may want to protect that same species for intrinsic 
values, or because they believe that the species may be a vital link in 
trophic levels that other species are dependent upon for survival; 
 Universities may want to explore this species because it may provide 
answers to other questions within the system, or because they believe 
that this species needs to be protected for future use or studies; 
 Local governments may want to exploit that species because it brings 
in tourism dollars in the form of fishing or “eco-tourism”; and 
 State or Federal Governments may have placed that species on a 
watch list and are directed through federal regulation to maintain and 
add to the current levels. 
 Another prospective wrinkle may take the form of which agency would 
lead the charge. If more than one agency decided that it wanted to 
control the technology for its own purposes, then there would be a 
potential for a control struggle between the agencies attempting the 
same goal—tracking small vessels—but for different purposes.  
c. Moving 
Once the technology has been cleared for use, it would begin to assimilate 
itself into the boater’s community through different forms of campaigns, as in the 
following: 1) new vessels would be constructed with this technology already 
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vessels with a federal database and receive and install their transponders; and 3) if 
vessels were to be taken out of the database (destroyed, no longer sea worthy, dry 
docked for an indefinite period, etc.), then a reclamation process to recover the 
technology would be required.  The NOAA would have to install their own 
infrastructure to handle the technology. 
d. Refreezing 
After the initial hurdle of fielding this technology has been accomplished, the 
maintenance and upkeep of the technology would be relatively simple. The 
infrastructure, as a result of emerging studies and theories, would be in a somewhat 
constant state of internal flux. Maintaining the appeal of this technology would also 
be an issue, and it may have to move accordingly with the current state of the 
stakeholders. That is, the current political climate may put an emphasis on a 
particular individual, group or species that may draw immediate attention and require 
a shift. 
e. Termination 
The entire evolution from concept to full fielding could be on the order of 
years. Therefore, the termination would happen as an overlap when the culture of 
fishers is such that this technology begins to become “natural” and no longer an 
imposition.   
Potential Timeline 
 April 2010: Beta Test for feasibility study on current technology 
 May 2010: Feasibility test on current state of technology60 
 October 2010: Publish findings on feasibility study61 
                                            
60 Another feasibility test may be required to further “fine tune” current technology. 
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 November 2010: Acquire funding for pilot study 
 January 2011: Initiate pilot studies and begin to acquire feel for current 
stakeholders in larger regions 
 March 2011: Hold “town hall” meetings in various regions to address 
stakeholders 
 July 2011: Approach vessel manufacturers about integration into hull 
designs on new models, and integration into older models 
 August 2011:  Address current state of IT infrastructure 
 January 2012: Publish findings from pilot study 
 February 2012: Hold more “town hall” meetings in various regions 
 March 2012: Initiate small-scale fielding to marine sanctuaries 
 December 2012: Assess effectiveness of small-scale fielding 
 January 2013: Hold “town hall” meetings to inform about full-scale 
implementation 
 April 2013: Full-scale implantation62 
 May 2013: Assess effectiveness of full-scale implementation on 
MRFSS 
 January 2015: Transponder batteries would need be replaced63 
2. Expectancy Theory 
a. Unfreezing 
If the fishers “buy in” (this group of stakeholders should provide the most 
resistance), then there is the ability to show them that with their assistance, better 
data could be collected. Thus, better recommendations could be made as to which 
                                            
62 This may be dependent on regional fishing seasons. 
63 This date is based on a 2-year battery life. Expect technology to allow for longer battery life or 
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species of fauna64 to regulate instead of blanket no-catch regulations (closing of 
certain fishing seasons). Therefore, their behavior can be shown as directly 
proportional to the enjoyment of their fishing experience in terms of catch and 
money. 
b. Refreezing 
Once the technology has proven beneficial to the fishers, the rewards for 
them would become more self-evident as stocks begin to reach their carrying 
capacities and limits are lifted. 
D. Data 
The target demographic would be the recreational boaters, primarily the 
recreational fishers. The data collected would be mostly qualitative. However, using 
inferential statistics, information could be quantified with respect to type of fishing, 
amount of fishing, location of fishing, length of fishing, and profession. 
a. Sample Survey Questions  
1. What types of fishing do you participate in?  (Circle one): 
  Recreational, Subsistence, Both 
 
2. Are you able to make a living with your fishing?   (Circle one):  
  Yes/No 
 
3. How many days per year do you fish? ____________ 
 
4. Where do you typically fish when you stay locally?    
 Specific Location: _____________________________
                                            
64 Fauna means carbon-based organisms other than plants. Here, this entails fish, abalone, octopi 
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5. When you travel outside of your local area, where do you typically go? 
 Specific Location: _____________________________ 
 
6. During a typical fishing trip, how many hours do you fish? 
 Hours: ___________________ 
 







do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 115 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
List of References 
Allen, T. (2008). Friend or foe? Tough to tell. U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 
Magazine, 134(10), 1268. 
 
Bailey, E. (2006). Anglers argue for salmon fishing. Los Angeles Times. Retrieved 
December 1, 2008, from http://articles.latimes.com/2006/apr/05/local/me-
salmon5 
 
Beeh, J.E. (1999). Adventure vs. ecotourism—Environmental impact of so-called 
ecotourist activities—Brief Article. E: The Environmental Magazine. Retrieved 
December 18, 2008, from 
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1594/is_3_10/ai_54623307 
 
Blumberg, S.J., & Luke, J.V. (2007). Coverage bias in traditional telephone surveys 
of low-income and young adults. Public Opinion, 71(5), 734–749. 
 
Borthick, A.F., Bowen, P.L., & Gerard, G.J. (2008). Modeling a business process 
and querying the resulting database: Analyzing RFID data to develop 
business intelligence. Journal of Information Systems, 22(2), 331–350. 
 
Broadhurst, G., June, J., Good, T., & Cowan, T. (2005). The impacts of derelict 
fishing gear to species and habitats in Puget Sound. Seattle: Northwest 
Straits Commission. 
 
Brown, M., & Kros, J. (2003). Datamining and the impact of missing data. Industrial 
Management & Data Systems, 103, 611–21. 
 
Brownstein, C. (2008). Report of the DHS national small vessel safety summit. 
Department of Homeland Security. Retrieved December 28, 2008, from 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/small_vessel_NSVSS_Report_HQ_508.pd 
 
Buckley, R. (2004). Environmental impacts of ecotourism. Cambridge, UK: CABI 
Publishing. 
 
Burke, W.W. (2008). Organization change: Theory and practice. Thousand Oaks, 
CA: Sage Publications. 
 
Campbell, L.M. (1998). Use them or lose them? Conservation and the consumptive 
use of marine turtle eggs at Ostional, Costa Rica. Environmental 
Conservation, 25(4), 305–319. 
 
Clapham, A.R. (1980). The IBP survey of conservation sites: An experimental study. 





do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 116 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
Committee on Fish Stock Assessment Methods, Ocean Studies Board, Commission 
on Geosciences, Environment, and Resources, National Research Council. 
(1998). Improving fish stock assessment. Washington, DC: National Academy 
Press. 
 
Conley, P.T., & Flanders, R.G. (2007). The Rhode Island State Constitution: A 
reference guide. Westport, RI: Praeger Publishers. 
 
Crofts, J.A. (2007). Radio frequency identification potential to monitor small vessels 
(Master’s Thesis). Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School. 
 
Daskalov, G.M., & Mamedov, E.V. (2007). Integrated fisheries assessment and 
possible causes for the collapse of anchovy kilka in the Caspian Sea. ICES 
Journal of Marine Science, 64(3), 503–511. 
 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS). (2008). Small vessel security strategy. 
Retrieved December 2008, from https://www.hsdl.org 
 
EcoHolidaying (UK). (2008, December 18). Environmental impact of tourism. 




Eggleston, D.B. (2007). Center for Marine Sciences and Technology annual report—
2006-2007. Raleigh: North Carolina State University. 
 
Fall, J.A., Brown, C.L., Caylor, D., Coffing, M., Georgette, S., Paige, A.W., et al. 
(2001). Alaska Subsistence Fisheries 2001 annual report. Juneau, AK: Alaska 
Department of Fish and Game, Divison of Subsistence. 
 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA). (2009). Federal aviation regulations. Part 
91.119(b). Washington, DC: Author.  Retrieved August 18, 2009, from 
http://ecfr.gpoaccess.gov/cgi/ 
 
Fish Net USA. (2006). The big lie, part II. Retrieved December 3, 2008, from 
http://www.fishingnj.org/netusa15.htm 
 
Garrett, G.A. (2007). World class contracting (4th ed.). Riverwoods, IL: Wolters 
Kulwer Law & Business. 
 
General Services Administration, Department of Defense, National Aeronautics and 






do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 117 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
Google. (2009). Google earth-free. Retrieved January 24, 2009, from 
http://earth.google.com/ 
Hanna, S.S. (1998). Institutions for marine ecosystems: Economic incentives and 
fishery management. Ecological Applications, 8(1), 170–174. 
 
Hardin, G. (1968). The tradegy of the commons. Science, 162(3859), 1243–1248. 
 
Hsu, S.-L., & Wilen, J.E. (1997). Ecosystem management and the 1996 Sustainable 
Fisheries Act. Ecology Law Quarterly, 24, 799–811. 
 
Hughes, J.D., & Thirgood, J.V. (1982). Deforestation, erosion, and forest 
management in ancient Greece and Rome. Journal of Forest History, 26(2), 
60–75. 
 
International Maritime Organization (IMO). (2007). The December 2000 
amendments. International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), 
1974. London: IMO Publishing Service. 
 
Jackson, J.B., Kirby, M.X., Berger, W.H., Bjorndal, K.A., Botsford, L.W., Bourque, 
B.J., et al. (2001). Historical overfishing and the recent collapse of coastal 
ecosystems. Science, 293(5530), 629–638. 
 
Johnson, D. (2002). Environmentally sustainable cruise tourism: A reality check. 
Marine Policy, 26(4), 261–270. 
 
Jones, E.C., & Chung, C.A. (2008). RFID in logistics: A practical introduction. Boca 
Raton, FL: CRC Press. 
 
Kanazawa, S. (2005). Who lies on surveys, and what can we do about it? The 
Journal of Social, Political, and Economic Studies, 30(3), 361–371. 
 
Kelly, E.P., & Erickson, G.S. (2005). RFID tags: Commercial applications v. privacy 
rights. Industrial Management + Data Systems, 105(6), 703–714. 
 
Kennedy, C. (2007). Evaluating the effects of screening for telephone service in 
dual-frame RDD surveys. Public Opinion Quarterly, 71(5), 750–771. 
 
King, O.H. (1995). Estimating the value of marine resources: A marine recreation 
case. Ocean & Coastal Management, 27(2), 129–141. 
 
Kinney, S. (2008). Coast Guard goes even higher tech: New system designed to find 






do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 118 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
Kleiber, P., & Maunder, M.N. (2008). Inherent bias in using aggregate CPUE to 
characterize abundance of fish species assemblages. Fisheries Research, 
93(2008), 140–145. 
 
Lee, E., Hu, M.Y., & Toh, R.S. (2000). Are consumer survey results distorted? 
Systematic impact of behavioral frequency and duration on survey response 
errors. Journal of Marketing Research, 37(1), 125–134. 
 
Lee, H., & Kim, J. (2006). Privacy threats and issues in mobile RFID. IEEE, 252(06), 
1-5. 
 
Li, S., Visich, J.K., Khumawala, B.M., & Zhang, C. (2006). Radio frequency 
identification technology: Applications, technical challenges and strategies. 
Sensor Review, 26(3), 193–202. 
 
Lin, C.-Y. (2008). Factors affecting the adoption of radio frequency identification 
technology by logistics service providers: An empirical study. International 
Journal of Management, 7(1), 488–501. 
 
Lipowicz, A. (2008). DHS may target small boats for RFID. Retrieved December 28, 
2008, from http://www.washingtontechnology.com 
  
Manaher, C. (2008). Use of radio frequency identification (RFID) technology for 
border crossings: Privacy impact assessment. Washington, DC: US 
Department of Homeland Security. 
 
McElderry, H. (2008). At-sea observing using video-based electronic monitoring. 
Victoria, BC: Archipelago Marine Research. 
 
McMurray, J. (2006, September). One fish, two fish: Fisheries management is about 
to get a lot more accurate. Saltwater Sportsman Magazine.  Retrieved 
January 12, 2009, from 
http://www.nycflyfishing.com/MRFSS%20Survey%20article.htm 
 
Miner, J. (2005). Organizational behavior: Essential theories of motivation and 
leadership. New York: M.E. Sharpe. 94–112 
 
Morrison, M.-J. (2002). MSC: The Minnesota State Consititution, a reference guide. 
Minneapolis, MN: Greenwood Publishing. 
 
Mullon, C., Freon, P., & Curry, P. (2005). The dynamics of collapse in world 





do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 119 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
National Marine Fisheries Service–Fisheries Statistics Division (NMFS–FSD). 
(2004). Statistical highlights: Fisheries of the United States, 2004. 
Washington, DC: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. 
 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). (n.d.). Recreational 
fishing services. Washington, DC: NOAA Fisheries–Office of Sustainable 
Fisheries. Retrieved December 3, 2008, from 
http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/sfa/PartnershipsCommunications/recfish/ 
 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). (2006). Draft 
environmental impact statement. Washington, DC: Department of Commerce. 
 
National Research Council (NRC). (2006). Review of recreational fisheries survey 
methods. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. 
 
NOAA Fisheries. (1996, October 11). Sustainable Fisheries Act. Retrieved March 
18, 2009, from http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/sfa/ 
 
Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization. (2007). United States research report for 
2007. Woods Hole, MA: National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration/National Marine Fisheries Service. 
 
Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD). (2004). A modular open systems 
approach (MOSA) to acquisitions. Retrieved May 20, 2009, from Open 
Systems Joint Task Force website, http://www.acq.osd.mil/osjtf/  
 
Oh, C.-O., Dixon, A.W., Mjelde, J.W., & Draper, J. (2008). Valuing visitors’ economic 
benefits of public beach access points. Ocean & Coastal Management, 
51(12), 847–853. 
 
Pierce, D.E., & Hughes, P.E. (1979). Insight into the methodology and logic behind 
National Marine Fisheries Service fish stock assessments, or how did you 
guys come up with those numbers, anyway? Boston: Office of Coastal Zone 
Management, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. 
 
Ranky, P.G. (2006). An introduction to radio frequency identification (RFID) methods 
and solutions. Assembly Automation, 28(1), 28–34. 
 
Rhode Island Recreational Licensing Subcommittee. (2001). RI marine fisheries 





do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 120 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
Rieback, M.R., Crispo, B., Tanenbaum, A.S. (2006). Is your cat infected with a 
computer virus? In Proceedings of the Fourth IEEE International Conference 
on Pervasive Computing and Communications (PerCom ’06) (pp. 169–179). 
IEEE. 
 
Rosenberger, S.R., & Stanley, T.D. (2006). Measurement, generalization, and 
publication: Sources of error in benefit transfers and thier management. 
Ecological Economics, 60(2), 372–378.    
 
Savi Technologies. (2007). Part 1: Active and passive RFID: Two distinct, but 
complementary, technologies for real-time supply chain visibility. Mountain 
View, California: Savi Technologies. 
 
Shepherd, G. (2006). Atlantic striped bass. Washington, DC: National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration. 
 
Silver, J.J., & Campbell, L.M. (2005). Fisher participation in research: Dilemmas with 
the use of fisher knowledge. Ocean & Coastal Management, 48(9-10), 721–
741. 
 
Smith, C.J., Papadopoulou, K.N., & Diliberto, S. (2000). Impact of otter trawling on 
an eastern Mediterranean commercial trawl fishing ground. ICES Journal of 
Marine Science, 57(5), 1340-1351. 
 
Suchanek, T.H. (1993). Oil impacts on marine invertebrate populations and 
communities. American Zoologist, 33(6), 510–523. 
 
Suman, D., Shivlani, M., & Milon, J.W. (1999). Perceptions and attitudes regarding 
marine reserves: A comparison of stakeholder groups in the Florida Keys 
National Marine Sanctuary. Ocean & Coastal Management, 42(12), 1019-
1040. 
 
Swarbrooke, J., Beard, C., Leckie, S., & Pomfret, G. (2003). Adventure tourism: The 
new frontier. Burlington, England: Elsevier Science. 
 
Technovelgy. (2006). Technovelgy.com-where science meets fiction. Retrieved 
December 29, 2008, from http://www.technovelgy.com/ct/Technology-
Article.asp?ArtNum=21 
 
The National Academies. (2008). Marine debris will likely worsen in the 21st century; 
Goal of zero waste discharge should be adopted. Washington, DC: Author. 
 
Thrush, S.F., Hewitt, J.E., Cummings, V.J., Dayton, P.K., Cryer, M., Turner, S.J., et 
al. (1998). Disturbance of the marine benthic habitat by commercial fishing: 





do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 121 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
 
Tobey, J., & Torell, E. (2006). Coastal poverty and MPA management in mainland 
Tanzania and Zanzibar. Ocean and Coastal Management, 49(11), 834-854. 
 
Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L). (2008, December 8). Operation of the defense 
acquisition system (DoDI 5000.02). Washington, DC: Author. 
 
United Nations (UN). (1982). United Nations convention on the law of the sea. 
Retrieved Decemeber 2, 2008, from 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/unclos/unclos_e.pd
f 
United States. (2009). CIA world factbook. Retrieved May 28, 2009, from 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/us.html 
 
United States Coast Guard (USCG). (n.d.). It's no joke. Retrieved December 5, 
2008, from http://www.uscgsandiego.com/go/doc/830/212203/ 
 
United States Coast Guard (USCG). (2008a). A Report on the strategic plan of the 
National Recreational Boating Safety Program 2007-2011. Washington, DC: 
Department of Homeland Security. 
 
United Stated Coast Guard (USCG). (2008b). Protecting America’s fisheries. 
Washington, DC: United States Department of Homeland Security. 
 
United States Coast Guard (USCG). (2009). How AIS works. US Coast Guard 
Navigation Center of Excellence. Retreived March 3, 2009, from 
htpp://www.navcen.uscg.gov/enav/ais/how_ais_works.htm 
 
United States Code (USC). (2007). Numbering undocumented vessels. Title 46, 
Chapter 123. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office. 
 
United States Department of Commerce–National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (US DoC–NOAA). (2007a). Magnuson-Stevens Fishery 
Conservation and Management Act. Washington, DC: United States 
Department of Commerce. 
 
United States Department of Commerce–National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (US DoC–NOAA). (2007b). Magnuson-Stevens Fishery 
Conservation and Management Act, Public Law 94-265, as amended by the 
Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Reauthorization 






do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 122 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
United States Department of Commerce–National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration-Fisheries (US DoC–NOAA). (2008). The Economic 
Contribution of Marine Angler Expenditures in the United States, 2006 (p. 21). 
Washington, DC: United States Department of Commerce 
 
Vaccaro, I., & Sepez, J. (2003). Three faces of North Pacific fisheries: Commercial, 
recreational, and subsistence fishing in Alaskan fishing communities. 
Washington, DC: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. 
 
Warner, B. (2008). Organization and change: Theory and practice. Thousand Oaks, 
CA: Sage Publications. 
 
William. S. (2008). Anglers in California spend over $2 billion annually on fishing-
related expenses; (report covers N. Cal, S. Cal, Central Valley and Delta 
Region). San Francisco: California Trout.  
 
Wright, L. (2006). The looming tower: Al-Qaeda and the road to 9/11. New York: 






do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 123 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
2003 - 2009 Sponsored Research Topics 
Acquisition Management 
 Acquiring Combat Capability via Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) 
 BCA: Contractor vs. Organic Growth 
 Defense Industry Consolidation 
 EU-US Defense Industrial Relationships 
 Knowledge Value Added (KVA) + Real Options (RO) Applied to 
Shipyard Planning Processes  
 Managing the Services Supply Chain 
 MOSA Contracting Implications 
 Portfolio Optimization via KVA + RO 
 Private Military Sector 
 Software Requirements for OA 
 Spiral Development 
 Strategy for Defense Acquisition Research 
 The Software, Hardware Asset Reuse Enterprise (SHARE) repository 
Contract Management 
 Commodity Sourcing Strategies 
 Contracting Government Procurement Functions 
 Contractors in 21st-century Combat Zone 
 Joint Contingency Contracting 
 Model for Optimizing Contingency Contracting, Planning and Execution 
 Navy Contract Writing Guide 
 Past Performance in Source Selection 
 Strategic Contingency Contracting 
 Transforming DoD Contract Closeout 
 USAF Energy Savings Performance Contracts 
 USAF IT Commodity Council 





do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 124 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
Financial Management 
 Acquisitions via Leasing: MPS case 
 Budget Scoring 
 Budgeting for Capabilities-based Planning 
 Capital Budgeting for the DoD 
 Energy Saving Contracts/DoD Mobile Assets 
 Financing DoD Budget via PPPs 
 Lessons from Private Sector Capital Budgeting for DoD Acquisition 
Budgeting Reform 
 PPPs and Government Financing 
 ROI of Information Warfare Systems 
 Special Termination Liability in MDAPs 
 Strategic Sourcing 
 Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) to Improve Cost Estimates 
Human Resources 
 Indefinite Reenlistment 
 Individual Augmentation 
 Learning Management Systems 
 Moral Conduct Waivers and First-tem Attrition 
 Retention 
 The Navy’s Selective Reenlistment Bonus (SRB) Management System 
 Tuition Assistance 
Logistics Management 
 Analysis of LAV Depot Maintenance 
 Army LOG MOD 
 ASDS Product Support Analysis 
 Cold-chain Logistics 
 Contractors Supporting Military Operations 
 Diffusion/Variability on Vendor Performance Evaluation 





do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 125 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
 Lean Six Sigma to Reduce Costs and Improve Readiness 
 Naval Aviation Maintenance and Process Improvement (2) 
 Optimizing CIWS Lifecycle Support (LCS) 
 Outsourcing the Pearl Harbor MK-48 Intermediate Maintenance 
Activity  
 Pallet Management System 
 PBL (4) 
 Privatization-NOSL/NAWCI 
 RFID (6) 
 Risk Analysis for Performance-based Logistics 
 R-TOC AEGIS Microwave Power Tubes 
 Sense-and-Respond Logistics Network 
 Strategic Sourcing 
Program Management 
 Building Collaborative Capacity 
 Business Process Reengineering (BPR) for LCS Mission Module 
Acquisition 
 Collaborative IT Tools Leveraging Competence 
 Contractor vs. Organic Support 
 Knowledge, Responsibilities and Decision Rights in MDAPs 
 KVA Applied to AEGIS and SSDS 
 Managing the Service Supply Chain 
 Measuring Uncertainty in Earned Value 
 Organizational Modeling and Simulation 
 Public-Private Partnership 
 Terminating Your Own Program 
 Utilizing Collaborative and Three-dimensional Imaging Technology 
 
A complete listing and electronic copies of published research are available on our 





















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK
 
 
 
 
^Åèìáëáíáçå=êÉëÉ~êÅÜ=mêçÖê~ã=
dê~Çì~íÉ=ëÅÜççä=çÑ=ÄìëáåÉëë=C=éìÄäáÅ=éçäáÅó=
k~î~ä=éçëíÖê~Çì~íÉ=ëÅÜççä=
RRR=avbo=ol^aI=fkdboplii=e^ii=
jlkqbobvI=`^ifclokf^=VPVQP=
www.acquisitionresearch.org 
